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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE
OUTLOOK FOR NEBRASKA
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments."
-Brown v. Board of Education'
"Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of
race... are traditionally disfavored."
-Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections 2
INTRODUCTION
Since 1968 suits have been filed in at least ten states3 alleging
that public school financing systems which rely primarily on local
ad valorem property taxes are unconstitutional in that they violate
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
legal basis for this contention is that these systems make the qual-
ity of education dependent upon the wealth of the particular
school district, thereby favoring school children who happen to live
in a district having high property values and discriminating
against children who live in districts having relatively little as-
sessable property. Two basic social principles are involved: (1)
the fundamental importance of a system of free public education
in a democracy, and (2) the belief that a government should not dis-
criminate between the rich and the poor in providing essential serv-
ices.
1. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
3. Texas: Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F.
Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971); Minnesota: Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334
F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Virginia: Burrus v. Wilkerson, 310 F.
Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mem. 397 U.S. 44 (1970); Illinois:
McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill.), affd mem., McInnis
v. Oglivie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); California: Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.
3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); New Jersey: Robinson
v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972). Michigan: Board
of Educ. v. Michigan, Gen. Civ. Action # 103342 (Cir. Ct. Wayne
County, Mich., filed Feb. 2, 1968); Wisconsin: Bellow v. Wisconsin,
# 127060 (Cir. Ct. Dane County, Wis., filed Jan. 24, 1969). In addition,
similar actions have recently been filed in Federal district courts in
Arkansas and Nebraska. Rupert v. Exon, Civil No. 72-0-142 (D. Neb.,
filed Feb. 11, 1972).
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On August 30, 1971, the Supreme Court of California decided
the leading case of Serrano v. Priest,4 in which it held that:
a public school financing system which relies heavily on local prop-
erty taxes and causes substantial disparities among individual
school districts in the amount of revenue available per pupil for
the districts' educational grants invidiously discriminates against
the poor and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5
Since all of the states except Hawaii have school financ-
ing systems which derive most of their revenue from local
property taxes, 6 the Serrano decision has far-reaching implications.
United States District Courts in Texas7 and Minnesota8 have ap-
plied the Serrano rationale to invalidate existing school funding
systems in those states, and a New Jersey Superior Court has cited
the Serrano decision with approval in a case in which the New
Jersey school financing system was held to violate the equal pro-
tection clauseY Public interest in the so-called "school tax" issue
is intense, especially in an election year in which rising property
taxes constitute a major political issue.1 0
In an effort to bring recent developments into sharper focus,
this article will examine the issue of public school finance and
the requirements of the equal protection clause from two perspec-
tives. First, the recent series of "school tax cases" will be ex-
amined in detail, with particular emphasis placed upon the Ser-
rano decision. An attempt will be made to determine the effect
that these cases will have on existing state education funding sys-
tems. Second, the Nebraska system's vulnerability to constitutional
attack in light of recent decisions will be considered.
EXISTING SCHOOL FINANCING SYsTEms: A BASIC EXPLANATION
A thorough understanding of the constitutional principles in-
volved in the school tax cases is dependent upon a basic familiarity
4. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
5. Id. at 587, 487 P.2d at 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
6. Hawaii's system of public school financing is completely centralized
in the State Board of Education. Disbursements for education are
made from the state's general fund according to the budget requests
of the Department of Education. HAwAu REv. LAws § 296-36 (Supp.
1965).
7. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280
(W.D. Tex. 1971).
8. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
9. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
10. For example, to protest rising property tax rates, a group of Wiscon-
sin taxpayers voted to withhold $312,235 in property taxes from local
school districts. Omaha World-Herald, Feb. 8, 1972 at 7, col. 5.
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with the characteristics of existing school financing systems. As
noted earlier, all of the states except Hawaii have school funding
systems which are characterized by reliance on ad valorem prop-
erty taxes assessed and collected by the local school districts.
This type of revenue is the largest single component of the state's
total education expenditure. The concept of decentralized fiscal
planning and policy-making is basic to the system of public edu-
cation in America, and its sudden exposure to criticism comes as
a social upheaval in many communities, especially those that fear
that centralization of education funding will result in the diver-
sion of some of their tax dollars to school districts having lower
tax bases.
The typical public school financing system is relatively simple
in operation. Approximately 50-75% of each district's available
funds are derived from a tax levied on real property located
within the district. Therefore, the amount of money which can
be spent for education in any given district is largely dependent
upon two factors: (1) the assessed property valuation of the dis-
trict, and (2) the mill levy, or rate of taxation, determined by the
residents of the district based on recommendations of school dis-
trict officials. The two factors are inversely proportional. For
example, suppose that two school districts having roughly equal
numbers of taxpayers and school children wish to provide the
same amount of money for the operation of their schools. A school
district having low assessed property valuation will have to tax each
of its residents at a substantially higher rate in order to generate
the same amount of revenue as the district having higher valuation
can generate at a lower mill levy. In practice, this system usu-
ally results in the wealthy district providing more educational
funds per pupil and taxing itself at lower rates than the poor dis-
trict. As the cases point out, this discriminatory effect is the basis
for the contention that present school financing systems deny
equal protection to children and taxpayers in property-poor school
districts.
The remaining 25-50% of the school district's educational budget
is derived from state aid to education and, to a small extent, fed-
eral aid. State aid to local school districts takes two basic forms:
(1) "foundation grants," which consist of certain flat sums of
money given to each district, usually on an Average Daily Mem-
bership (A.D.M.) basis;'1 and (2) "equalization aid," which is an
11. This figure is determined by dividing the aggregate days of attend-
ance and absence of each student enrolled in a particular school dis-
trict by the actual number of days school was in session with pupils
and teachers in attendance. Aid is then allocated on the basis of
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effort by the state to minimize the funding disparities between
districts caused by unequal property valuations. Equalization
funds are apportioned among school districts so as to provide
greater amounts of state aid to districts with a lower property tax
base per A.D.M.
Foundation aid is distributed to the school districts without re-
gard to the wealth of the district; a rich district and a poor dis-
trict each receive an equal amount per A.D.M. The distribution
of equalization aid, however, is more complex. In the most common
form of equalization funding, the state first determines the "in-
sured need." This is the basic amount which the state recognizes
as the cost of education per regular A.D.M. per year. This amount
is guaranteed to each school district, provided that the district
qualifies for the aid by taxing itself at a specified minimum rate.
The qualifying level, or "minimum rate," guarantees a local tax
effort. The amount of equalization aid that each district receives
is determined by computing the difference between the amount
of revenue that could be raised in the district by taxing at the
prescribed minimum rate and the insured need per A.D.M. for the
district. It should be noted that the amount of equalization aid
that a particular district receives is not influenced by the amount
of revenue that the district actually produces through taxation;
the computation for purposes of determining equalization aid is
made using a hypothetical mill levy that is usually substantially
below the actual mill levy in the district. Thus, the equalization
aid programs help to minimize the disparity in local tax revenue
caused by varying property valuations in the school districts.
Many states employ a state education aid program which in-
cludes both foundation grants and equalization aid. This can be
accomplished in two ways: (1) the foundation aid is distributed
to each district, regardless of whether it receives equalization aid;
or (2) the foundation aid is added to the amount that could be
raised by taxing at the hypothetical mill levy and this sum is sub-
tracted from the "insured need" of the district.
Thus, the states have made an effort to equalize per pupil
expenditures in the various school districts by supplementing lo-
cally obtained revenue with one or more of the methods dis-
cussed. Unfortunately, the effect of these efforts has been min-
Average Daily Membership by grade groups. Average Daily Attend-
ance (A.D.A.) is often used instead of A.D.M. A.D.A. is the aggre-
gate days of attendance of all the pupils in a school district divided
by the number of days that the school was actually in session with
pupils and teachers in attendance. State aid calculations are based on
the previous year's A.D.M. or A.D.A.
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imized because of the state's relatively small contribution to the
total education budget of a school district. Recognizing the failure
of state efforts to bring about equalization, proponents of school
finance reform have turned to the courts for relief on constitu-
tional grounds.
PART ONE: THE SCHOOL TAX CASES
I. EARLY CASES
A. McInnis v. Shapiro: A Starting Point
The first reported decision dealing with the constitutionality
of traditional school finance systems was McInnis v. Shapiro,
12
decided on November 15, 1968, by a three-judge federal district
court in the Northern District of Illinois. The suit was initiated by
legal aid lawyers as a class action on behalf of elementary and
high school pupils in the four public school districts of Cook
County, Illinois. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
a number of Illinois statutes upon which the state's education fi-
nance system was based. They alleged that the system resulted
in wide disparities in per pupil expenditure among the school dis-
tricts of the state and a concomitant disparity in the quality of
education received by students in the various districts. The system
allegedly failed to distribute funds to the school districts on the
basis of the "educational needs" of the students since the primary
determinant of the amount of funds available for education was
the assessed property valuation within any given school district.
Claiming to be victims of this discrimination, the plaintiffs alleged
that the statutes violated their rights under the equal protection
and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. They
asked the court to declare the existing school financing structure
unconstitutional and to enjoin further disbursements under the
existing system.
The McInnis court upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois
statutes, basing its decision on two determinations: (1) that there
was no constitutional requirement that public school expenditures
be made only on the basis of educational needs of the student or on
any other basis that would require equal per pupil expenditure;
(2) that the controversy was "non-justiciable" because of the ab-
sence of any "'discoverable and manageable standards' by which
the court can determine when the Constitution is satisfied and when
it is violated."' 3
,12. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill.), affd mem., McInnis v. Oglivie, 394 U.S.
322 (1969).
13. Id. at 335. The court pointed out that the school tax issue was not a
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Illinois was divided into approximately 1300 school districts,
and in 1966-67 each district spent an average of $840 per pupil.14
Of this amount, 75% was derived from local property tax revenues,
20% from state aid, and 5% from federal aid and miscellaneous
sources. Per pupil expenditures varied from $480 in the poorest
districts to $1000 in the wealthiest. State aid consisted of a com-
bination of foundation grants and equalization aid. The state guar-
anteed that each district would have a minimum of $400 per stu-
dent in the following manner: if the sum of (1) local revenue that
could be raised by taxing at the minimum specified mill levy and
(2) the amount of the foundation grant, distributed on a per pupil
basis in all districts, did not equal $400 per student, the state
would provide the difference in the form of equalization aid.
It is significant to note that this particular type of state educa-
tion aid has been criticized as having an anti-equalizing effect and
actually adding to the inequities of the local property tax.'5 In
effect, the foundation grant is used to diminish the amount of
equalization aid that a poor district will receive while its effect
on the wealthy district is to augment the already large education
expenditure.
It is apparent from the pleadings and the court's opinion in
McInnis that neither the court nor the parties were fully prepared
to deal with the basic issue. The plaintiffs used recent cases in-
volving school desegregation, legislative reapportionment, and the
rights of indigent criminal defendants to support their contention
that the Illinois school funding system caused a denial of equal
protection based on an arbitrary and unsupportable classifica-
tion. Rather than applying specific constitutional arguments to the
facts of their case, the plaintiffs seemed to contend that their
case came under the penumbra of these decisions.' 6 As a result,
"political question" in the sense defined in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962); nevertheless, it based its determination of non-justicia-
bility on the fact that there were no effective standards which a
court could use to determine when a school financing system com-
plies with the equal protection clause and when it does not. In com-
paring the school finance issue to the reapportionment cases the court
seemed to be looking for some definite criteria, such as the "one
man-one vote" standard.
14. Id. at 330. The Illinois school financing system challenged in Mc-
Innis was similar to systems found in most states.
15. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable
Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CATF. L. REv.
305, 315 (1969).
16. The court was unwilling to extend the cases presented by the plain-
tiffs in support of their position beyond their own facts. For instance,
the court commented that the school desegregation cases, while aris-
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the court was confused as to the primary constitutional basis of
the plaintiffs' claim for relief, pointing out that uniform per pupil
expenditures in all districts equivalent to that of the poorest dis-
trict would apparently satisfy the equal protection argument while
providing uniform substandard education. 17 Assuming that this
was not the result that the plaintiffs sought, the court inferred
that they were really asking for relief on a theory of substantive
due process, involving a judicial requirement that the state pro-
vide equal per pupil expenditures for all students at a level sub-
stantially above the present expenditure in poor districts. The
court was clearly unwilling to go this far; thus, it held that the
plaintiffs had not sustained the burden of proving that the Illi-
nois statutes resulted in "invidious discrimination" in violation of
the equal protection clause.1 8
Even if the plaintiffs had presented a more viable constitutional
argument, however, the McInnis court would have been unwilling
to invalidate the Illinois statutes because of its belief that the con-
troversy presented in the case was "non-justiciable." Implicit here
was the court's strong reluctance to declare the state legislation
invalid without being able to suggest a constitutionally accept-
able alternative. To this end, the plaintiffs provided no assist-
ance. Their contention that funds should be distributed according
to the "educational needs" of school children was unacceptable
to the court because the plaintiffs made no attempt to define the
term or explain how the standard could be implemented. Sim-
ilarly, the court rejected a rigid standard of equal per pupil ex-
penditure, reasoning that such a standard would be unworkable
because of cost differentials in the various districts. Underlying
the McInnis decision was the court's firm conviction that the en-
tire issue of public school financing was outside the province of
the judiciary and properly left to the legislative branches of state
and local governments. In concluding that "no judicially manage-
able standard" had been presented, the court stated: "Even if
there were some guidelines available to the judiciary, the courts
simply cannot provide the empirical research and consultation
necessary for intelligent educational planning." 19
After the district court dismissed the complaint in Mclnnis,
ing in the setting of public education, dealt with the legal issue of
racial discrimination. The court was unwilling to interpret these cases
as standing for the proposition that any type of discrimination in-
volving public education violated the equal protection clause. 293 F.
Supp. at 334.
17. Id. at 331 n. 11.
18. Id. at 334.
19. Id. at 335.
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the plaintiffs made a direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. The decision was affirmed per curiam without argument
or opinion.20
B. McInnis to Serrano: A Period of Cautious Reliance
Prior to the decision of Serrano v. Priest,21 McInnis was cited
in several cases for the proposition that the equal protection
clause does not require strict equality in education expenditures
or appropriations. In Burruss v. Wilkerson2 2 a federal district
court in Virginia dismissed a complaint which alleged that Vir-
ginia's public school financing system resulted in a denial of equal
protection to students living in school districts which had low tax
bases. The Virginia system was almost identical to that of Illi-
nois, and the court relied solely on McInnis as authority for up-
holding its constitutionality. The court was in complete agree-
ment with the factual basis of the complaint; 23 however, as in
McInnis it held that the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action
based on the equal protection clause because there was no evi-
dence of "invidious discrimination" in Virginia's school funding
system. The court concurred with the McInnis holding of non-jus-
ticiability as well, stating that the courts are not equipped "to
tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs" of students in
various school districts. 24
Two additional cases which dealt with education issues other
than general funding followed McInnis in holding that the equal
protection clause does not require equal education expenditures.
In Johnson v. New York State Education Department,25 which in-
volved the question of whether the state could lawfully provide
20. McInnis v. Oglivie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). Justice Douglas was of the
opinion that the Court should note probable jurisdiction and set the
case for oral argument.
21. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
22. 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
23. The court stated: "Truth is, the inequalities suffered by the school
children of Bath are due to the inability of the county to obtain,
locally, the moneys needed to be added to the State contribution to
raise the educational provision to the level of that of some of the
other counties or cities. The blame cannot be placed on the people or
the officials of the county. Rather, it is ascribable solely to the ab-
sence of taxable values sufficient to produce the required moneys."
Id. at 574.
24. Id.
25. 319 F. Supp. 271 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). Free textbooks were provided for
high school students but not for grade school pupils. The court found
a rational basis for this classification in that high school students re-
quired more numerous and expensive textbooks than grade school
students.
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free textbooks to students in certain grades, a federal district
court in New York held that there was no constitutional require-
ment "that school expenditures be made only on the basis of ed-
ucational need."2 6 And in West Morris Regional Board of Educa-
tion v. Sills,2 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: "The im-
mediate point is that, at least as of now ... there is no constitu-
tional fiat that educational expenditures be identical for all stu-
dents throughout the State. Benefits may indeed depend upon
the district of the student's residence. '28
The first perceptible crack in the armor of the McInnis doc-
trine came in Hargrave v. Kirk2 9 which was decided in 1970 by a
federal district court in Florida. The Florida "Millage Rollback
Act ' 30 which required school districts to limit their mill levies to
ten mills in order to qualify for state aid to education was attacked
as a denial of equal protection by residents of property-poor
school districts who needed to tax at a relatively high rate in order
to provide enough revenue to operate their schools. Because of
the statute these districts were faced with the dilemma of lower-
ing their mill levies far below the level at which they could sup-
port their schools or foregoing any state aid. The court held that
there was no rational basis for this statute, and therefore its dis-
criminatory effect on residents of poor school districts resulted
in a denial of equal protection.31 It is significant to note that the
Hargrave decision did not go to the broader question of whether
26. Id. at 280. The court also cited Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), which held that the equal protection clause does not require
a state to eliminate all discriminatory effects in economic and social
welfare legislation. Dandridge involved an attack on a Maryland
regulation which set a maximum amount of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children that a family could receive, regardless of size or
need. The Court held that the limitation did not affect freedoms
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and was therefore subject to the less
stringent "rational basis" equal protection test. See discussion of
"fundamental interest" in connection with Serrano v. Priest, infra nn.
73-90 and accompanying text.
27. 58 N.J. 464, 279 A.2d 609 (1971). In this case, the New Jersey court
upheld the constitutionality of a statute which authorized state
funds for providing transportation for pupils attending certain public
and private schools. Pupils who attended profit-making private
schools were expressly excluded from the benefits of the statute, and
the plaintiffs alleged that this exclusion resulted in a denial of equal
protection.
28. Id. at 478, 279 A.2d at 616.
29. 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated on other grounds, Askew
v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 236.251 (1968), repealed, Laws 1970, c. 70-94, § 9(effective July 1, 1974).
31. 313 F. Supp. at 948.
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a school funding system relying primarily on local property taxes
violated the equal protection clause; indeed, the court distin-
guished McInnis on that basis.32 Nevertheless, the decision raised
grave doubts as to the constitutionality of such a system 33 and
foreshadowed the revolutionary decision in Serrano v. Priest.
II. SERRANO V. PRIEST
In mid-1971 the slow progress of school finance reform was
given new life by the Supreme Court of California's holding in
Serrano v. Priest.34 In an opinion which may prove to be the im-
petus for massive nation-wide restructuring of state public educa-
tion financing systems, the court stated:
[T]he California public school financing system, with its substan-
tial dependence on local property taxes and resultant wide dispar-
ities in school revenue . . . invidiously discriminates against the
poor because it makes the quality of a child's education a func-
tion of the wealth of his parents and neighbors. We have con-
cluded, therefore, that such a system cannot withstand constitu-
tional challenge and must fall before the equal protection clause.35
The California school financing system was substantially the same
as those of other states, including the Illinois system upheld in
McInnis. Serrano, therefore, represents a diametric departure from
the McInnis doctrine.
A. Factual Basis
Serrano v. Priest was a class action initiated in the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County by elementary and high school pu-
pils and their parents against state and county officials who were
32. The U.S. Supreme Court later vacated the judgment entered by the
district court, holding that the lower court erred in failing to consider
the state's argument that judgment should be deferred pending deci-
sion of a case being litigated in the Florida state courts which chal-
lenged the legislation on state constitutional grounds. It is signifi-
cant to note that in remanding the case the Supreme Court noted that
the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient factual data to support an
equal protection claim in that they had not refuted the state's con-
tention that the law was not discriminatory but was merely a part
of a program to provide a "massive infusion" of state money into
several poor school districts. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. at 478-79.
Thus, the Supreme Court seemed to imply that a complaint alleging
facts sufficient to show actual discrimination based on unequal edu-
cational expenditure by operation of state law would state a cause of
action under an equal protection theory.
33. See Comment, Constitutional Law: Financing Public Education Un-
der the Equal Protection Clause, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 590 (1971).
34. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
35. Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
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responsible for the administration of the state's school financing
system. The students claimed to represent a class of all public
school pupils in California "except children in that school district,
the identity of which is presently unknown, which ... affords the
greatest educational opportunity of all school districts in Califor-
nia. '30 The plaintiff parents claimed to represent a class of all
parents who had children attending California public schools and
who paid real property taxes in the school district of their resi-
dence. The complaint alleged that California's school financing
system:
Makes the quality of education for school age children in Cali-
fornia ... a function of the wealth of the children's parents and
neighbors, as measured by the tax base of the school district in
which the children reside and . .. a function of the geographical
accident of the school district in which the children reside, and
... fails to take account of any of the variety of educational needs
of the several school districts (and of the children therein) ...
and . . .fails to provide children of substantially equal age, ap-
titude, motivation, and ability with substantially equal educational
resources. . . .37
Basing their claim of denial of equal protection on these allega-
tions the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the California school
financing system was unconstitutional and an order requiring the
defendants to reallocate school tax funds in a manner consistent
with the requirements of equal protection.38 The trial court sus-
tained the defendants' general demurrers and after the plaintiffs
failed to amend the complaint the defendants' motion to dismiss
was granted. The case thus reached the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia on an appeal from the granting of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
B. The California Public School Financing System
Since the public school financing system which was challenged
in Serrano was substantially the same as the Illinois system dis-
cussed previously, a brief description of the California system will
suffice here. At the time that the suit was filed, 55.7% of all public
school funds were derived from local ad valorem property taxes,
36. Id.
37. Id. at 590 n.1, 487 P.2d at 1244 n.1, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05 n.l.
38. In addition, the plaintiffs asked the court to retain jurisdiction of the
action so that it could institute a restructuring of the state's educa-
tional financing system if the state legislature failed to act. In revers-
ing the granting of the defendants' motion to dismiss, the Supreme
Court of California remanded the case to the trial court for further
action consistent with its decision. Thus, the supreme court did not
have to decide the question of retention of jurisdiction.
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35.5% from state aid, 6.1% from federal aid, and the remaining 2.7%
from miscellaneous sources.3 9 The tax bases of the various dis-
tricts ranged from $103 per pupil to $952,156 per pupil. Most school
districts in California had voted to override mill levy limits im-
posed by the legislature in order to provide more money for edu-
cation. This system resulted in disparities in annual per pupil ex-
penditure ranging from $402 in the poorest district to $2,586 in the
wealthiest.
State education funds were distributed to local school districts
in the form of a combination of foundation grants and equalization
aid. The computation of the amount to be paid to each district
was made in the same manner as under the Illinois system. The
state guaranteed that each district would be able to spend a mini-
mum annual amount of $355 for each elementary school pupil and
$488 for each high school pupil. These funds would be derived
from local property taxes, state foundation grants of $125 per
pupil, and, if necessary, state equalization aid. Particularly poor
school districts that were willing to sustain a slightly higher tax
burden prescribed by the state could qualify for an additional
amount of $125 per student in the form of supplemental aid.
The Supreme Court of California concluded as a matter of fact
that this funding system, relying as it did on local property taxes,
caused wide disparities in the amount of money that the various
districts could spend for education. These disparities were not suf-
ficiently offset by the equalization aid provided by the state.40
The court was therefore faced with the more complex question of
whether the spending disparities were inconsistent with the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
C. The Constitutional Issues
1. Choosing a Test
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have em-
ployed a two level test by which a legislative classification may
be measured to determine whether it results in a denial of equal
protection. If the classification is merely incidental to a legitimate
legislative purpose and does not infringe on any constitutionally
protected right, a presumption of constitutionality arises and the
legislation will not be invalidated unless the party alleging un-
39. The court relied on statistics taken from Legislative Analyst, Public
School Finance, Part I, Expenditures for Education (1970), cited at 5
Cal. 3d. at 591-92 n.2, 487 P.2d at 1246 n.2, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606 n.2.
40. Id. at 594, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
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constitutionality can prove that the classification bears no rational
relationship to the achievement of the state's legislative purpose.
On the other hand, if the legislation in question involves certain
"suspect classifications" or touches on a "fundamental interest,"
the courts will subject the legislative classification to what has
been termed "strict scrutiny," shifting the burden of proof to the
state and requiring it to show that it has a compelling interest
which justifies the classification and that the classification is nec-
essary to the accomplishment of that purpose.4 1
The first standard, known as the "rational basis test," was
first applied to legislative classifications resulting from the states'
attempts to regulate business and commerce. The courts recog-
nized the necessity for such legislation and the fact that a certain
degree of classification was inherent in most regulatory statutes.
In order to discourage meretricious constitutional attacks upon
such legislation by business interests which would prefer to re-
main unregulated, the courts imposed the heavy burden of the ra-
tional basis standard on parties challenging this type of legisla-
tion. For instance, in Williamson v. Lee Optical42 the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute
which prohibited opticians from dispensing and duplicating opti-
cal lens without a prescription. Sellers of ready-to-wear glasses
were exempted from the prescription requirement, and the group
of opticians that brought the suit alleged that because of this ex-
emption the statute placed them in a disfavored class and resulted
in an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. The Court re-
jected this contention and held that the statute and its resulting
classification bore a rational relationship to the legitimate state
objective of protecting the health and welfare of its citizens. In
defining the scope of the equal protection clause the Court in Wil-
liamson held that its prohibition extended "no further than in-
vidious discrimination. '43
Similarly, in McGowan v. Maryland,44 the Supreme Court held
that a Maryland Sunday Closing Law which enumerated certain
41. For a detailed analysis of the development of this two-level test see
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. RFv. 1064,
1076-1131 (1969). The Supreme Court of California has implemented
this test in other recent decisions dealing with the equal protection
clause. See, e.g., Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784, 471 P.2d
487, 500, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852 (1970); Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. Cali-
fornia, 71 Cal.2d 566, 578-79, 456 P.2d 645, 653-54, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77,
85-86 (1969).
42. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
43. Id. at 489.
44. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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goods that could be sold on Sundays while prohibiting sales of
all other goods and services was not an invidious discrimination
since the enumerated goods were "necessities" and the classifica-
tion was thus reasonably related to the protection of the public.
Thus, the Court held that if a legislative classification met the
requirements of the rational basis test, it was not an invidious
discrimination prohibited by the equal protection clause. Con-
versely, legislative classifications for which the state could show
no rational basis were invalidated as invidious discrimination.
These included an Illinois statute requiring all sellers of money or-
ders except the American Express Company to be licensed and
regulated by the state"5 and an Oklahoma statute requiring steri-
lization of "habitual criminals. '46
The second equal protection standard, known as the "compell-
ing state interest test," grew out of judicial disfavor with certain
types of legislative classifications. If a state law employs a "sus-
pect classification" based on considerations of race47 or wealth, 4
or if the classification touches on a "fundamental interest" such
as the right to vote49 or the right to procedural safeguards in a
criminal prosecution, 0 the state will be required to bear a heavier
burden of justification than a mere showing of a rational basis.
In such cases a presumption of unconstitutionality arises, and the
state can rebut it only by showing that the classification is essen-
tial to the advancement of a compelling state interest.51
The Serrano court had no difficulty in concluding that the
state's school funding system should be subjected to the "strict
scrutiny" of the compelling state interest standard. The applica-
tion of this standard was based on two findings: (1) the financing
system employed a "suspect classification" since the amount of
money that a school district could spend for education was de-
45. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
46. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
47. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
48. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-18 (1956).
49. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
50. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); In re Anatazo, 3 Cal.
3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
51. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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pendent upon the wealth of the district as determined by its prop-
erty base; and (2) the classification touched upon the plaintiffs'
"fundamental interest" in obtaining an education. 5, The first of
these findings was well-supported by precedent; the second is a
unique holding based largely on public policy and analogy.
2. Classification Based on Wealti: A Suspeci Classification
The Serrano court was on firm ground in determining that leg-
islation which imposes a classification based on wealth must be
justified by some compelling state interest. In Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections5" the Supreme Court declared Virginia's poll
tax unconstitutional, holding that the levy of a tax was not es-
sential to the state's interest in insuring voter qualifications since
the ability to pay the tax was "not germane to one's ability to par-
ticipate intelligently in the electoral process." 54  In Harper the
Supreme Court emphasized that classification based on wealth
should be examined carefully because, like classifications based on
race, it was presumed to violate the equal protection clause. The
Court in Harper reversed an earlier decision5 5 upholding the poll
tax, observing that "notions of what constitutes equal treatment
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change."5 6 Since
the Harper decision the Supreme Court has used the same ration-
ale to invalidate laws in New York57 and Louisiana58 which re-
quired voters in certain local elections to be "property owners."
Similarly, the Supreme Court has taken a dim view of state
laws which result in a limitation of the constitutional safeguards
available to the indigent criminal defendant. In Griffin v. Illi-
nois,59 the Court held that provisions of the Illinois Post-Convic-
tion Hearing Act which authorized free trial transcripts only to de-
fendants who were seeking appellate review of constitutional ques-
tions denied equal protection to convicted defendants who were
prevented from obtaining appellate review of non-constitutional
questions solely because of their inability to afford the cost of a
transcript. The Court condemned the conditioning of the right
52. In order to apply the "compelling state interest test," the court must
find either a suspect classification or infringement on a "fundamental
interest." The Serrano court found both elements present in the
school tax issue.
53. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
54. Id. at 668.
55. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
56. 383 U.S. at 669.
57. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
58. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
59. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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to appellate review on the ability to pay for a transcript, holding
that "there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has." 60
The Griffin rationale has been widely followed in other cases
involving indigent criminal defendants. A defendant is entitled
to counsel during the trial61 and appellate 6 2 stages of his prose-
cution, whether or not he can afford to pay an attorney. He can-
not be imprisoned indefinitely because of his inability to pay a
fine,63 and he cannot be required to "work off" a fine by spend-
ing a specified period of time in jail in lieu of paying the fine.6 4
The Supreme Court has recently extended the Griffin rationale to
certain civil litigants, holding in Boddie v. Connecticut65 that
a party may not be denied the right to sue for divorce because of
his inability to pay court costs and fees. Thus, legislative classi-
fications based on wealth have been subjected to the strict scrutiny
of the courts, and in most cases the state has been unable to show
that such classifications are necessary for the advancement of a
compelling state interest.
Relying on these cases, the Serrano court concluded that Cali-
fornia's school funding system resulted in a classification based
on wealth which had to be subjected to a compelling state inter-
est test.66 It is significant to note that the discriminatory effect
of the school financing system in Serrano differed in two respects
from "wealth discrimination" in Harper, Griffin and related cases.
First, the concept of "wealth" in Serrano referred to the aggregate
wealth of the school district, whereas all previous wealth discrim-
ination cases dealt with legislation which focused on the wealth of
the individual. The Serrano court recognized this distinction, but
it considered classifications based on aggregate wealth and those
based on individual wealth to be equally invidious. Commenting
on the suspect nature of classification based on the wealth of the
school district, the court observed:
60. Id. at 19.
61. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
62. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
63. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970).
64. In re Anatazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
65. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Although the majority based its opinion on the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Brennan
stated in a concurring opinion that the Griffin equal protection ra-
tionale was applicable as well: "Where money determines not merely
'the kind of trial a man gets' [citing Griffin], but whether he gets
into court at all, the great principle of equal protection becomes a
mockery." 401 U.S. at 389-90.
66. 5 Cal. 3d at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
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The commercial and industrial property which augments a dis-
trict's tax base is distributed unevenly throughout the state. To
allot more educational dollars to the children of one district
than to those of another merely because of the fortuitous presence
of such property is to make the quality of a child's education
dependent upon the location of private commercial and industrial
establishments. Surely, this is to rely on the most irrelevant of
factors as the basis for educational financing.67
The Serrano decision differs from earlier wealth classification
cases in another significant respect. In all of the previous cases,
the ability to pay was a prerequisite to the exercise of some fun-
damental right. In Harper, a prospective voter was required to pay
the poll tax before he was allowed to vote. In .Griffin a defend-
ant had to pay for a transcript of his trial before he could ob-
tain appellate review. Similarly, in Williams v. Illinois6 s the
convicted defendant was faced with the dilemma of paying a fine
which he could not afford or serving a jail sentence. And in
Boddie v. Connecticut a person who wanted a divorce had to pay
various filing fees before he could bring his suit. In all of these
cases, the fact that an individual did not have a required amount
of money resulted in an absolute denial of some fundamental right.
The discriminatory effect of the school financing system in Ser-
rano, however, was more subtle. No child in California was de-
nied an education because of the relatively low tax base of the dis-
trict in which he lived. In Serrano, however, the court held that
he was denied educational opportunities equal to those provided
by school districts having higher tax bases. Thus, Serrano seems
to go one step beyond earlier wealth discrimination cases by re-
quiring that wealth must have no qualitative limiting effect on
the exercise of a constitutional right.69
Although the Serrano court did not discuss it, there is author-
ity for the proposition that legislation which results in a partial
limitation on the exercise of a constitutional right can result in a
denial of equal protection. This "dilution" theory was pre-
sented in the Supreme Court's legislative reapportionment cases.
In Reynolds v. Sims70 the Court invalidated a state legislative ap-
portionment scheme because it had the effect of giving more
weight to votes cast in a sparsely populated legislative district
while "diluting" the importance of an individual vote cast in a
heavily populated district. According to the Supreme Court, this
"dilution" constituted a denial of equal protection.
67. Id. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13.
68. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
69. See note 84 infra and accompanying text.
70. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence im-
pairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendmentjust as much as invidious discriminations based on factors such as
race ... or economic status .... 71
Although the Serrano court did not use this argument to sup-
port its holding with respect to wealth discrimination, it did ap-
ply the rationale to another issue. Recognizing that many of its
early school desegregation cases involved complete denial of the
right to attend public schools, the court suggested that denial of
equal protection is not limited to instances where there has been
an absolute denial of a constitutional right.72
3. Education as a Fundamenial Inierest
The Serrano court recognized that prior cases had invalidated
wealth classifications only in connection with certain constitu-
tionally protected "fundamental interests," including voting rights
and the rights of criminal defendants. 7 3  Relying primarily on
supporting dicta and strong public policy considerations, the court
held for the first time that the right to receive a public educa-
tion was a "fundamental interest" which was entitled to the safe-
guards of the equal protection clause.74
Cases involving racial discrimination in the context of public
education played an important role in the Serrano decision. The
court's reasoning was syllogistic: (1) denial of educational oppor-
tunities because of a child's race is a denial of equal protection;
(2) legislative classifications based on wealth and those based on
race are equally suspect; (3) therefore, a denial of educational op-
portunities based on considerations of wealth is a denial of equal
protection.
The obvious analogy, of course, was Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.75 The Supreme Court's extended discussion in Brown of the
importance of public education to the individual and to society
was highly persuasive dicta. Brown stopped short of specifically
declaring that the right to obtain an education was guaranteed by
the constitution, but the admonition to the states was clear: "In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
71. Id. at 566.
72. "[S] urely, the right to an education today means more than access to
the classroom." 5 Cal. 3d at 607, 487 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
617.
73. Id. at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
74. Id. at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
FINANCING PUBLIC EDUCATION
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on an equal basis."7 6
The emphasis placed on the importance of education in Brown
is reflected in prior decisions of the Supreme Court of California.
The California court had referred to the "twin themes of the im-
portance of education to the individual and to society" 77 in its
decisions dealing with racial discrimination in the public schools,
and it had gone further than most state and federal courts in ex-
tending the requirements of equal protection in this area. For
example, in two cases involving controversial public education is-
sues the court upheld the validity of a statute requiring busing of
pupils to achieve racial balance in schools,78 and it declared that
de facto racial segregation was violative of the equal protection
clause.7 9 In Manjares v. Newton 8° the court observed that edu-
cation was the "sine qua non of a useful existence":
In light of the public interest in conserving the resources of
young minds, we must unsympathetically examine any action of a
public body which has the effect of depriving children of the op-
portunity to obtain an education.81
Thus, there was already authority in California for subjecting
legislative classifications affecting education to the "strict scrutiny"
of the courts.
To reinforce its decision that education is a fundamental inter-
est, the Serrano court drew a comparison between education and
the rights of the indigent criminal defendant. It concluded that
education has a "far greater social significance" than the inter-
ests of such defendants since it affects a greater number of people
and has a direct influence on "each and every other value of a
democratic society. 8s2 Here, as throughout the opinion, the court
relied on a study entitled "Educational Opportunity: A Work-
able Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures."83  This
study was compiled by three California attorneys in 1969 and
deals extensively with California's school funding system. While
the authors of this study support the analogy between the school
76. Id. at 493.
77. 5 Cal. 3d at 606, 487 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
78. San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d
669, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1971).
79. Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 606 (1963).
80. 64 Cal. 2d 365, 411 P.2d 901, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966).
81. Id. at 375-76, 411 P.2d at 908, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
82. 5 Cal. 3d at 607, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618, citing Coons,
Clune & Sugarman, supra note 15, at 362-63.
83. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 15.
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tax issue and the cases protecting criminal defendants from wealth
discrimination up to a point, they warn that the analogy can be
damaging to the argument that California's school funding sys-
tem results in a denial of equal protection.8 4 For example, the
holding in Douglas v. California interpreted the equal protection
clause as requiring only that the indigent criminal defendant be
represented by counsel at the appellate level. It did not require
any qualitative level of representation other than the basic mini-
mum of competence, and it did not establish any requirements of
"equality of representation." Applied to the issue in Serrano, this
reasoning would lend support to the state's argument that since
there had been some effort to offset wealth disparities through
state equalization aid, there was no denial of equal protection.
As stated earlier, the Serrano court did not make the distinction
between absolute denial of a constitutionally protected right and
partial limitation of the exercise of that right caused by legisla-
tive classification based on wealth, even though its holding would
appear to remove that distinction. The failure of the court to deal
with this issue casts doubt on the validity of its reliance on Doug-
las, Griffin, and related wealth discrimination cases.
The court drew a similar analogy between education and the
right to vote, pointing out that "both are crucial to participation
in, and the functioning of, a democracy."85  Implicit is the argu-
ment that the rationale of Harper should be applied to classifica-
tions based on wealth and affecting education. This argument has
considerable merit. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, the authors of
the aforementioned study on school finance, point out that from
the standpoint of the individual, educational opportunity is an
even greater fundamental interest than the right to vote because
it has a more significant practical effect on the life of the individual
than the simple act of casting a vote in an election.8 6
Finally, the court considered the public policy arguments which
had been made in support of the proposition that educational op-
portunity was indeed a "fundamental interest." Relying again on
the Coons, Clune, and Sugarman study, the court listed the fol-
lowing factors: (1) education provides the individual with oppor-
tunity for economic advancement; (2) it is universally relevant;
(3) it continues over a relatively long period of the individual's
life; (4) it molds the personalities of children; and (5) it has
been made compulsory by the state.8 7 In light of these factors,
84. Id. at 361.
85. 5 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
86. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 15, at 367.
87. 5 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-619.
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the court concluded: "We are convinced that the distinctive and
priceless function of education in our society warrants, indeed
compels, our treating it as a 'fundamental interest.' "88
The significance of this holding must be assessed from two per-
spectives. Its immediate effect was to provide the basis for in-
validating California's school financing system and to notify the
California legislature that future legislation dealing with educa-
tion would be carefully scrutinized by the courts. Other courts
which have subsequently invalidated existing school financing sys-
tems have all recognized and applied the Serrano holding that ed-
ucation is a fundamental interest.89 Whatever its eventual impact
will be on the question of educational finance, Serrano has long
range importance as a constitutional interpretation adding new di-
mension to the equal protection clause. The Serrano court defined
the term "fundamental interest" as including not only those rights
specifically guaranteed by the constitution but also those that the
court may conclude to be basic and essential in a democracy. The
court emphasized that its decision defining education as a funda-
mental interest did not automatically subject all tax-supported
public activities to the limitations of the equal protection clause
because education is unique among the state's tax-supported pub-
lic welfare services.90 However, the effectiveness of the court's
limitation on its holding in Serrano can be assessed only in light of
the decision's future implementation.
4. Applying he Test
The Serrano court held that the State of California had failed
to meet its burden of proving that the school funding system was
necessary to the advancement of any compelling state interest.
The state's unsuccessful argument was based on two principal con-
tentions: (1) a school funding system based on local property tax
revenue was a legitimate exercise of the state's duty to preserve
local control over public schools;91 and (2) the alleged discrimina-
tion resulted solely from the establishment of local school district
boundaries, and since there was no constitutional requirement
for territorial uniformity of school districts, there was no denial of
equal protection.92
88. Id. at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
89. See Section I, infra, for a discussion of cases which have followed
the Serrano holding.
90. 5 Cal. 3d at 613-14, 487 P.2d at 1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622-23.
91. Id. at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
92. Id.
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a. Insuring Local Control
The state's first argument was based on the traditional idea
that the residents of local school districts should have primary con-
trol over the public schools in their district.93 The state contended
that local schools can be operated most efficiently by residents of
the local districts, and that a necessary part of decentralized con-
trol was local determination of the amount of money to be spent
for education. Therefore, the citizens of each district should be
free to assess their property and establish mill levies accordingly.
The Serrano court disposed of the second portion of the argu-
ment by pointing to the fact that the existing system actually
precluded a free determination of the level at which the district
wished to tax itself for education since residents of districts hav-
ing low tax bases had to maintain high mill levies in order to ob-
tain minimum education revenues, while the reverse was true in
districts which had high tax bases.9 4 However, the court did not
dispute the state's contention that it had a compelling interest in
preserving local control of public education; the decision was based
on the court's determination that the existing financing system was
not necessary to the accomplishment of that purpose. The court
stated: "No matter how the state decides to finance its system of
public education, it can still leave this decision-making in the
hands of the local districts."9 5
It is suggested that the problem of maintaining local policy
control in the absence of local fiscal control is more complex than
the court's decision in Serrano would indicate. As a practical mat-
ter, local school districts would have serious problems in making
policy decisions if school funding were centralized in the state or
otherwise taken out of the control of the local districts. The
solution to this problem is essential to the implementation of Ser-
rano, and the court's summary treatment of the question will be
of little assistance to state and local governments in finding the
solution.
93. See, e.g., BENSON, THE EcoNoxI~cs OF PuBLic EDUCATION 4 (2d ed.
1964): "Without doubt, the elementary and secondary schools in the
United States represent the largest decentralized public institution in
the western world. Local control has afforded a vitality of interest
in education; such a benefit calls for preserving the power of local
authorities to make certain kinds of decisions."
94. 5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620. Pointing to the
absence of any form of "fiscal freewill" in the existing funding sys-
tem, the court did not find it necessary to determine whether "de-




b. Territorial Uniformity-A Constitutional Requirement?
The state also contended that the alleged discrimination caused
by varying tax bases was not a denial of equal protection since
it resulted accidentally from the legitimate exercise of the state's
right to establish the geographical boundaries of the various school
districts. In light of the Supreme Court's legislative reapportion-
ment cases, it is surprising that this argument was even pre-
sented. In Gray v. Sanders9" the Court invalidated a Georgia
county-unit voting method in which each county had one vote in
determining candidates for primary elections. This system had the
effect of equating counties of unequal population so that the ac-
tual significance of an individual vote was greater in a county
having a low population than in a densely populated county. The
Court held that this "debasement" of votes resulted in a denial of
equal protection to voters who happened to reside in the populous
counties. In Reynolds v. Sims 97 the Court used a similar rationale
in invalidating a state legislative apportionment scheme which con-
sisted of legislative districts having unequal populations. The
Court held that the apportionment scheme amounted to a denial of
equal protection through "geographical discrimination," stating that
the "fact that an individual lives here or there is not a legiti-
mate reason for overweighting or diluting his vote."98  Seizing
the obvious analogy, the Serrano court stated: "If a voter's ad-
dress may not determine the weight to which his ballot is en-
titled, surely it should not determine the quality of his child's ed-
ucation."99
Parenthetically, it has been noted that the reapportionment
cases are relevant to the school tax issue not only because of their
holding that geographical discrimination is unconstitutional but
also because they "dispose of the argument that history or custom
affords a basis for differentiating among citizens."' 0 0  Thus, the
fact that existing school financing systems have the sanction of
history does not justify their unlawful discriminatory effect.
D. The Question of Standards
The Serrano decision contains no affirmative standards or
guidelines which could be applied in restructuring California's ed-
ucational financing system. However, subsequent decisions in
96. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
97. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
98. Id. at 567.
99. 5 Cal. 3d at 613, 487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
100. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 583, 586 (1968).
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other jurisdictions have interpreted Serrano as requiring only that
"the level of spending for a child's education may not be a func-
tion of wealth other than wealth of the state as a whole."''1 1
This standard was originally proposed by Coons, Clune, and Sugar-
man in the 1969 study which was cited extensively in Serrano as a
measure for determining whether a school financing system meets
the requirements of the equal protection clause. The authors con-
tended that this standard would insure equal protection while al-
lowing state legislatures a maximum degree of flexibility in re-
structuring their school finance systems since the only requirement
is that any relationship between wealth and the quality of educa-
tion be removed. Referring to their proposed standard as "Propo-
sition I," Coons, Clune, and Sugarman stated:
To sum up, Proposition I is tempered to the needs of the situation
and to the demands of the judicial role. It does not grandly in-
sist that children be treated differently because of their biologi-
cal, cultural, or intellectual differences. It does not require that
they be treated uniformly because of their sameness. It insists
only that they be treated fairly in the choice of economic mechan-
ism by which their public education is supported. We are well
content with a constitutional meaning for "equality of opportunity"
that can be understood and then can be applied to the grosser
objective aberrations of the existing systems-those springing from
that measure of wealth chosen by the state itself to determine ed-
ucational quality. The Supreme Court seems likely to share this
modesty and to prefer to leave the proper distinctions between
children to be drawn by legislatures and administrators.102
Thus, Serrano appears to have dealt with the constitutional ques-
tion in the school tax issue while holding "judicial legislation" to
a minimum and allowing state legislatures a free hand in restruc-
turing educational finance programs.
On the question of a constitutional standard for financing pub-
lic schools, the Serrano court found it necessary to distinguish
its decision from the holding in McInnis v. Shapiro'0 3 that the
school tax issue lacked "discoverable and manageable standards"
and was therefore non-justiciable. In distinguishing the cases the
California court stated:
The instant complaint employs a standard which has guided de-
cisions of both the United States and California Supreme Courts:
discrimination on the basis of wealth is an inherently suspect
classification which may be justified only on the basis of a com-
pelling state interest .... By contrast, the McInnis plaintiffs
repeatedly emphasized "educational needs" as the proper standard
101. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D. Minn. 1971).
102. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 15, at 343-44.
103. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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for measuring school financing against the equal protection
clause.104
This distinction is not entirely accurate. McInnis held that even
if the Illinois school financing system were shown to be uncon-
stitutional, the courts were not equipped to formulate viable
standards for restructuring school finance systems and thus the
entire issue was "non-justiciable." The real distinction between
the two cases is that the Serrano court was willing to declare
the state's school funding system unconstitutional and then allow
the legislature to devise a new system, while the McInnis court
was apparently unwilling to declare the existing system uncon-
stitutional without being able to suggest a constitutionally accept-
able alternative.
The standards problem in the school tax issue was anticipated
in an article written in 1968 by Professor Phillip Kurland of
the University of Chicago.10 5 Professor Kurland suggested that
the success of any fundamental decision based on the equal protec-
tion clause depends on the presence of at least two of the following
three requirements: (1) a simple constitutional standard; (2) a
means of judicial enforcement; and (3) public acquiescence in the
decision. 106 To illustrate, he suggested that the success in imple-
menting the Supreme Court's legislative reapportionment decisions
has been due to the fact that the "one man-one vote" standard
was simple and did not meet any substantial public resistance.
Due to the presence of these two factors, the absence of any means
of judicial enforcement was not a problem. In contrast, Professor
Kurland suggested that the slow and painful implementation of
the Brown school desegregation decision has been due to the fact
that public resistance was high and there was no adequate means
of judicial enforcement of the decision. Professor Kurland antici-
pated that a decision invalidating state education financing systems
which rely on local ad valorem property taxes would encounter
the same implementation difficulties as the school desegregation
cases due to a lack of public acquiescence and judicial enforcement
procedures. It is submitted that the problems in implementing the
Serrano decision will be insurmountable unless legislatures are
able to accept and apply the negative constitutional standard em-
ployed by the California court.
IIL AFTER SEAmo: Tim PRmiciPL OF FIscAL NEUTRALITY
The holding and rationale of Serrano v. Priest have been adopted
104. 5 Cal. 3d at 617, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25.
105. Kurland, supra note 100.
106. Id. at 592.
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in three recent decisions which invalidate state educational fund-
ing systems on equal protection grounds. In Van Dusartz v. Hat-
field,10 7 a federal district court in Minnesota held that that state's
educational financing system, relying heavily on local property tax
revenue, deprived public school pupils of their "right under the
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to have
the level of spending for their education unaffected by variations
in the taxable wealth of their school district or their parents."'0 8
The court attributed this "right" to the Serrano decision, and re-
ferred to the constitutional standard employed in Serrano as the
"principle of fiscal neutrality." The court followed the Serrano
rationale to the letter, finding (1) that Minnesota's school funding
system resulted in classification based on wealth which had a sub-
stantial effect on the fundamental interest of education, and (2)
that the state failed in meeting its burden of proving that the exist-
ing system was necessary to the advancement of a compelling state
interest.
The fiscal neutrality concept was employed by another federal
district court in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
District'0 9 to invalidate Texas' school financing system. The Texas
system was substantially the same as those of California and Min-
nesota, and the court relied on Serrano and Van Dusartz in reach-
ing its decision:
The current system of financing public education discriminates on
the basis of wealth by permitting citizens of affluent districts to
provide a higher quality of education for their children, while pay-
ing lower taxes .... 110
The Rodriguez court held that Texas, like California and Minne-
sota, had failed to justify its school financing system under the
compelling state interest test.
The most recent school tax case is Robinson v. CahMl,111 de-
cided by the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, in January
of 1972. The court held that New Jersey's school financing system
violated the equal protection clause as well as state constitutional
provisions which required the state to provide a "thorough and
efficient" system of education 11 2 and to raise revenue for general
public purposes by uniform tax levies throughout the state." 3
107. 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
108. Id. at 872.
109. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
110. Id. at 285.
111. 118 N.J. Super 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
112. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § I, par. 1 (a).
113. Id. at § IV, par. 1.
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Unlike the previous school tax cases, Robinson specifically or-
dered the state to assume responsibility for distributing educational
revenue. The court held that public education is the primary re-
sponsibility of the state, not the parent or the local school dis-
trict, and should not be left to "the mood-in some cases the low
aspirations-of the taxpayers of a given district, even whose chil-
dren attend schools in the district.""14 The court ordered the New
Jersey legislature to restructure the state's educational financing
system in accordance with its opinion by January 1, 1974, after
which operation of the existing system would be enjoined." 5 The
Robinson requirement of a centralized educational funding system
represents the most definitive judicial statement to date with re-
gard to the future of school finance.
IV. A SUMMARY OF TI SCHOOL TAx CASES
Serrano v. Priest and its progeny present a strong and convinc-
ing argument that existing school funding systems result in a de-
nial of equal protection to students who happen to reside in dis-
tricts which have low tax bases. Recent Supreme Court decisions
support the underlying argument that the equal protection clause
applies not only to obvious and intentional forms of discrimina-
tion but also to more subtle discriminatory classifications that
result unintentionally from the operation of state laws.116 Even
those who oppose court-ordered restructuring of school financing
systems concede that the constitutional argument is persuasive and
is likely to result in a Supreme Court decision invalidating exist-
ing systems on equal protection grounds." 7
114. 1,18 N.J. Super at 279 287 A.2d at 216.
115. Id. at 280-81, 287 A.2d at 217.
116. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), in which the Su-
preme Court invalidated a one year residency requirement for appli-
cation for state welfare benefits. The Court held that members of
the class of potential welfare recipients who had recently moved into
the state were denied equal protection of the law. In the absence
of a showing of a compelling state interest in this legislation, the Court
struck down the residency requirement as a denial of equal protection.
117. Professor Phillip Kurland of the University of Chicago, one of the
most prominent opponents of extending the equal protection clause
into the area of public school finance, states: "I should tell you then,
with some assurance, that sooner or later the Supreme Court will
affirm the proposition that a State is obligated by the equal protec-
tion clause to afford equal opportunity without regard to local wealth
or determination of spending levels to all of its public school stu-
dents. But I should tell you that such a decision, if it comes sooner
rather than later, will probably only be the creation of a greater prob-
lem and not the solution to this one." Kurland, Equal Educational
Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined,
35 U. Cm. L. R.v. 583 (1968).
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PART TWO: EDUCATIONAL FINANCING IN NEBRASKA
Although Nebraska school fund income originates from the four
separable sources of local, county, federal, and state governments,
local sources account for seventy per cent of all school district in-
come.118 The fact that ninety-one per cent of all funds obtained
from local sources are attributable to local ad valorem property
taxes" 9 conclusively establishes the eminent role of ad valorem
property taxation in Nebraska education. Revenue for the support
of Nebraska's educational system is unequivocally dependent upon
the assessed value of taxable property and the millage or rate of
taxation. 20
I. LocAL REvENuFE
With a map furnished by the county superintendent of public
instruction showing every school district or part of a school dis-
trict within the county,' 2' it is the duty of the county assessor to
list and assess all taxable real property within his county. 22 All
non-exempt tangible and real property subject to taxation is listed
by the county assessor at actual value and assessed at thirty-five
per cent of actual value. 23 The assessed value is considered the
118. Sources and Amounts of Nebraska Public School District General Fund
Income for Fiscal 1969-1970.*
Receipts Per Percentage
Income Sources Total Revenue Receipts Average Daily of Total
Membership Receipts
Local Sources $165,790,859.11 $503.86 70.5
County Sources 10,751,807.67 32.65 4.6
State Sources 44,365,789.70 134.84 18.9
Federal Sources 14,073,351.72 42.77 6.0
* THE ANNuA REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION TO THE Gov-
ERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA FOR THE FIScAL YEAR COMMENCING
JULY 1, 1969, Am ENDiNG JUNE 30, 1970, at S-29, -42 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as 1970 GOVEwoNR's REPORT]. See Appendix, Exhibit A.
119. 1970 GOVERNOR's REPORT S-29.
120. The rate of taxation is expressed as "mills" or one part per thousand.
The mill levy or millage times the assessed valuation of the taxable
property yields the property tax. Therefore 15 mills X $2,000 as-
sessed valuation = .015 X $2,000 = $30 tax.
121. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-407 (Reissue 1971).
122. NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-1311 (Reissue 1971) provides that the county
assessor "shall have general supervision over and direction of the as-
sessment of all property in his county."
123. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-201 (Reissue 1971). NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-202
(Reissue 1971) provides:
"(1) the following property shall be exempt from taxes:
(a) The property of the state and governmental subdivisions;
(b) Property owned by and used exclusively for agricultural and
horticultural societies;
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taxable value on which the tax levy is made. Following the de-
termination of the assessed value of property within a school
district, tax rates may be established to raise the funds required
by local budgets.
Legislation detailing the budgetary procedure exists in two
forms: a "blanket act" establishing a uniform budgeting procedure
for all tax supported governmental subdivisions of the state and
several individual statutes dealing with budgeting procedures for
Nebraska's six classes of school districts.12 4  The Nebraska Budget
(c) Property owned and used exclusively for educational, reli-
gious, charitable, or cemetery purposes, when such property is not
owned or used for financial gain or profit to either the owner or
user; and
(d) Household goods, including major appliances either attached
or detached to real property, and personal effects when such prop-
erty is not owned or used for financial gain or profit to either the
owner or user.(2) The increased value of land by reason of shade and orna-
mental trees planted along the highway shall not be taken into ac-
count in the assessment of such land.
(3) The premiums received by any insurance company authorized
to do business in this state on pension, profit-sharing and other em-
ployee benefit plans which are described in section 805 (d) (1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended as of January 1, 1965, shall
be exempt from taxes.
(4) Life insurance and life insurance annuity contracts and any
payment connected therewith and any right to pension or retirement
payments shall be exempt from the intangible tax."
NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-202.01 (Reissue 1971) provides that any per-
son, corporation or organization desirous of tax exempt status for any
tangible personal property must apply for such exemption to the
county assessor by January 1.
It should be noted that homesteads are assessed for taxation the
same as other property, except that NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-202.13 (Reis-
sue 1971) provides: "that there shall be exempt from taxation (1)
the first twenty-five per cent of the actual value of any homestead
having an actual value of fifteen hundred dollars or less, (2) the first
twenty per cent of the first four thousand dollars of the actual value
of any homestead having an actual value in excess of fifteen hun-
dred dollars, and (3) the first ninety per cent of the actual value of
any homestead of any veteran ... or the unremarried widow of any
such veteran, or the unremarried widow of a serviceman who died
while on active duty ... The percentages in subdivisions (1) and(2) of this section shall be increased to fifty and forty-five, respec-
tively, in the case of any veteran ... for the year in which he
reaches seventy years of age and for each subsequent year, or the
unremarried widow or widower of any such veteran or the husband
or wife of any such veteran when the veteran is not the owner of
record."
124. NEB. Rav. STAT. §. 79-102 (Reissue 1971) provides:
"School districts in this state are classified as follows:
106 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 52, NO. 1 (1972)
Act 1 25 establishes a uniform budgeting procedure for all state tax
supported governmental subdivisions with the exception of "home-
rule" cities 1 26 and those governmental bodies with an annual
budget of less than $5,000.127 The law requires that all affected
governmental subdivisions prepare an itemized three-year compari-
son of expenditures and revenues; 128 publish a budget summary
and notice of a public hearing at least five days prior to the hear-
ing;129 and hold a public budget hearing prior to the adoption of
the budget. 1 30 In addition, once the budget is adopted it must be
certified and filed with the county clerk on or before the 15th day
of August each year.' 3 ' Individual budgeting provisions dealing
with the separate classes of school districts provide more budgetary
details and point out some conflicts with respect to the budget-
ing procedure. 18 2  In all instances it is the duty of the respective
(1) Class I shall include any school district that maintains only
elementary grades through the direction of a single school board;(2) Class II shall include any school district embracing territory
having a population of one thousand inhabitants or less that main-
tains both elementary and high school grades under the direction of a
single school board;
(3) Class III shall include any school district embracing territory
having a population of more than one thousand and less than fifty
thousand inhabitants that maintains both elementary and high school
grades under the direction of a single board of education;
(4) Class IV shall include any school district embracing territory
having a population of more than fifty thousand and less than two
hundred thousand inhabitans that maintains both elementary and
high school grades under the direction of a single board of education;
(5) Class V shall include any district embracing territory having
a population of two hundred thousand or more that maintains both
elementary grades and high school grades under the direction of a
single board of education; and
(6) Class VI shall include any district in this state that maintains
only a high school."
Classification is made by the Commissioner of Education based on
the number of inhabitants ascertained by the most recent United
States Census or by a certified census taken of the district at the direc-
tion of the district board of education and approved by the State Board
of Education. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-105 & 106 (Reissue 1971).
125. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 23-921 to -933 (Reissue 1970).
126. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-932 (Reissue 1970).
127. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-921 (Supp. 1972). The Act specifically in-
cludes school boards as the governing body of the school district.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-922(1) (Reissue 1970).
128. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-923 (Supp. 1972).
129. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-925 (Supp. 1972).
130. Id.
131. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-927 (Supp. 1972).
132. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-435 (Reissue 1971) applies to all classes of school
districts, Classes I through VI inclusive. This section provides that
at the time the budget is certified to the levying board, a copy of the
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county boards to levy the amount necessary from property taxes
to provide the budget amounts requested.133
With the exception of Class I and II school districts, which are
limited to a maximum millage of twelve mills, all school districts
in Nebraska may levy an unrestricted amount for general school
purposes.' 34 However, Class I and II districts are not totally
budget must be submitted to the county superintendent and county
clerk.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-810 (Reissue 1971) applies specifically to
Class III school districts. This statute requires that the board of edu-
cation of each district annually, on or before July 15, submit a report
to the county board showing the entire tax revenue of the previous
year and a budget for the ensuing fiscal year containing the amounts
required for general support, for school sites, for school buildings, for
payment of bond interest and for the bond sinking fund. It should
be noted that the filing date conflicts with §23-927 of the Nebraska
Budget Act which did not repeal or amend § 79-810.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-903 (Reissue 1971) applies specifically to
Class IV school districts. This section requires the board of education
to submit an estimate of the funds needed for the ensuing fiscal year
on or before August 15 of each year to the county board. Such esti-
mate must include amounts needed for the payment of bond interest;
the sinking fund for the payment of bonds; the purchase of school
sites, the construction and remodeling of buildings, and new equip-
ment; and the general operation of the school district.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1007 (Reissue 1971) applies specifically to
Class V school districts. This section directs the board of education
to submit a budget estimate in July and to report to the county clerk
the number of mills necessary to raise needed funds for the general fi-
nancial support of the schools, the purchase of school sites, the build-
ing and remodeling of the buildings, the payment of interest on bonds
and the sinking fund for payment of bonds. It should be noted
that this July filing date conflicts with § 23-927 of the Nebraska Bud-
get Act which did not repeal or amend § 79-1007.
133. The Nebraska Budget Act provides that each governing body shall
file with and certify to the levying board on or before August 15 a
copy of the adopted budget statement, together with the amount of tax
to be levied. NEB. REv. STAT. § 23-927 (Supp. 1972). Nebraska law
states that with regard to Class III districts "it shall be the duty of
the county board to levy and collect such taxes as indicated by all
the data contained in the budget ... ." NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-810(Reissue 1971). With regard to Class IV districts "the county board
shall levy and collect the number of mills necessary to provide the
amounts so reported by the board of education. . . ." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 79-903 (Reissue 1971). Nebraska law states that with regard to
Class V districts "the county board of equalization is authorized,
directed, and required to levy and collect the number of mills of tax
so reported and demanded by the board of education .... " NEB. REV.
STAT. § 79-1007 (Reissue 1971).
134. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-432 (Reissue 1971) provides that Class I and II
school districts may not adopt a higher levy than 12 mills for gen-
eral school purposes. All other districts are unlimited in the size of
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locked in at a twelve mill ceiling as the level of millage may be
increased by the approval of sixty-five per cent of the electors
present and voting at an annual meeting, special meeting or elec-
tion called for such a purpose.1 35  The various school districts
also have the power to raise tax monies for various other purposes
such as building schools, paying interest and principal on bonds,
and building playgrounds and recreational centers 136
Since the needs of the school district are related to the number
of students to be served, the ability or relative wealth to support
levy they may adopt: NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-432 (Reissue 1971) (Class
III and VI school districts); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-904 (Reissue 1971)(Class IV school districts); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1007.02 (Reissue
1971) (Class V school districts).
135. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-432 (Reissue 1971).
136. All classes of school districts may levy a tax for a recreation fund
for playgrounds and recreation centers including buildings. NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 14-514, 23-820 (Reissue 1970). Class I and HI districts
may levy a tax up to 5.00 mills for building a schoolhouse or addi-
tions and improvements, including the purchase of equipment, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 79-422 (Reissue 1971); up to 5.00 mills for building a
schoolhouse or repairing and equipping one, or to build or purchase
a teacherage, NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-506.03 (Reissue 1971); for the
amount necessary to pay the cost certified by the county superintend-
ent to establish a free high school tuition fund, NEB. REv. STAT. §
79-436 (Reissue 1971); for the amount necessary to pay judgments ren-
dered against the district by a court of law, NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-
1620 (Reissue 1971); for the amount necessary to pay interest and
principal on bonds, NEB. REV. STAT. § 10-711 (Reissue 1970); and for
the amount necessary to pay interest and principal on bonds issued
in compromise of indebtedness, NEB. REV. STAT. § 10-304 (Reissue
1970).
Class III school districts may levy a tax for the amount necessary
to build, lease or purchase a teacherage for school employees, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 79-541 (Reissue 1971); for the amount necessary to pay in-
terest and principal on bonds, NEB. REV. STAT. § 10-711 (Reissue 1970);
and up to 4.00 mills for a special fund for sites and buildings, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 79-811 (Reissue 1971).
Class III, IV, V and VI school districts may levy a tax for the
amount necessary to pay interest and principal on bonds issued for the
compromise of indebtedness, NEB. REV. STAT. § 10-304 (Reissue 1970);
and for the amount necessary to pay judgments rendered against the
district by a court of law, NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1620 (Reissue 1971).
Class V school districts may levy a tax of up to 4.00 mills for sites
and buildings and furnishing the same and for the amount necessary
for the payment of interest and retiring bonds, NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-
1007.02 (Reissue 1971); and up to 2.00 mills for the payment of serv-
ice annuities for school retirement, NEBs. REV. STAT. § 79-1052 (Reis-
sue 1971).
Class VI school districts may levy a tax of up to 5.00 mills to build
a schoolhouse, additions or improvements and to purchase equipment,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-422 (Reissue 1971); and for the amount neces-
sary to build, lease or purchase a teacherage, NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-
541 (Reissue 1971).
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schools is often expressed as the ratio of the district's assessed
property value to its student enrollment membership.'3 7 There-
fore, those districts with a larger assessed valuation per pupil are
able to raise more tax money per pupil than a district with a
smaller assessed valuation per pupil when the two districts both
tax at the same mill levy. It is possible for a district with a low
assessed valuation to tax at a much higher mill levy than a dis-
trict with a high assessed valuation and still raise less funds
per pupil.
For example, in Nebraska the Bellevue school district in Sarpy
County has an assessed valuation of $40,585,824 or $3,765.27 per
pupil. The Harrisburg school district in Banner County has an as-
sessed valuation of $13,708,067 or $53,132.04 per pupil. The Belle-
vue mill levy is 49.40 mills, while the Harrisburg district supports
education with a levy of only 18.82 mills.138
In addition, Nebraska has 1408 school districts, 139 more than
any other state in the country.140 This large number of school
districts encompassing grossly differing economic and population
areas substantially increases the problem of differing local abilities
for school district support.
Besides the large amount of local revenue generated by the ad
valorem property tax, income is contributed to the Nebraska school
general fund from various other local sources. Public power dis-
trict taxes,' 4' local license fees,142 tuition paid by districts,143 tui-
137. Fiscal ability = assessed valuation (A.V.) /student enrollment.
138. Appendix, Exhibit B.
139. NEBRASKA STATE DEP'T OF EDUcATION, REPORT OF THE NEB. STATE
COMVM. FOR SCHOOL DIST. REORGANIZATION (1971); Appendix, Exhibit D.
140. Appendix, Exhibit D. School tax suits, seeking a ruling that depend-
ence of schools on local property taxation is unconstitutional be-
cause it makes educational opportunity a function not of need but of
local wealth and is therefore a denial of equal protection of the law,
have been filed in each of the four leading states in terms of number
of local school districts. Suits have been filed in Nebraska which
has 1408 local districts, Rupert v. Exon, Civil No. 72-0-142 (D. Neb.,
filed Feb. 11, 1972); in Texas which has 1,198 local districts, Rod-
riguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 337 F. Supp. 280
(W.D. Tex. 1971); in Illinois which has 1,178 local districts, McInnis
v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. IM. 1969), aff'd mem. McInnis v.
Oglivie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); and in California which has 1,123 local
districts, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601 (1971).
141. NEB. REV. STAT. § 70-651.04 (Reissue 1971).
142. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5 provides: "All fines, penalties, and license
money, arising under the general laws of the state, except fines and
penalties for violation of laws prohibiting the overloading of vehicles
used upon the public roads and highways of this state, shall belong
and be paid over to the counties respectively, where the same may
be levied or imposed, and all fines, penalties, and license money aris-
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tion paid by individuals, transportation costs paid by districts,'1 44
transportation costs paid by individuals, and other local revenue
receipts all combine to contribute approximately five per cent of
the total state school revenues from local sources. 14 5
II. COUNTY REVENUE
County income is a rather insignificant source of education
revenue when compared to the total receipts of the Nebraska school
general fund.146  County sources consist of free high school tuition
monies,14 7 fines and license fees 148 and other county receipts.
1 9
Because county revenue is rather insubstantial, it is often found
grouped with local revenue for the purpose of discussion.
ing under the rules, by-laws, or ordinances of cities, villages, pre-
cincts, or other municipal subdivision less than a county, shall belong
and be paid over to the same respectively. All such fines, penalties
and license money shall be apportioned exclusively to the use and
support of the common schools in the respective subdivisions where
the same may accrue ...."
NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-138.01 (Reissue 1968) provides that all retail
liquor license fees received by a city or village treasurer shall inure to
the school fund of the district lying wholly or partially within the cor-
porate limits of such city or village. In addition, all license fees
received by the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission for licenses,
including beer, regardless of the alcoholic content, shall be credited by
the State Treasurer to the school fund as provided in NEB. CONST.
art. VII, § 5.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 75-327 (Reissue 1971) provides that each itener-
ant merchant shall pay a twenty-five dollar license fee for each vehi-
cle used in the conduct of his business. Such fees are to be credited
by the State Treasurer to the school fund, to be apportioned, allocated,
and distributed according to the provisions of NEB. CONST., art. VII,
§ 5.
143. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-445 (Reissue 1971).
144. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-490 (Reissue 1971).
145. 1970 GOVERNOR's REPORT, supra note 118; Appendix, Exhibit A.
146. Id.
147. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-436 (Reissue 1971).
148. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1302 (Reissue 1971).
149. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-142 (Reissue 1970) provides that penalties of
20% of the delinquent debt due a county is payable into the county
treasury for the benefit of the school fund when such penalty is col-
lected; NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1815 (Reissue 1970) provides that the
proceeds from the sale of unclaimed money and papers found upon
or near a body upon which an inquest is held vest in the school fund
of the county; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2708 (Reissue 1964) provides that
bail forfeitures are credited to the county school fund; NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 52-604 (Reissue 1968) provides that the unclaimed balance of pro-
ceeds from the sale of personal property in satisfaction of a lien shall
be paid into the school fund of the proper county; NEB. REV. STAT. §
77-2403 (Reissue 1971) provides that unclaimed witness fees shall be
credited to the common school fund of the county; and NEB. REv.
STAT. § 78-107 (Reissue 1971) provides that unclaimed proceeds from
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III. FEDERAL REVENUE
With all the emphasis placed on federal aid to education over
the past years, it is surprising to find that federal aid to Nebraska
education is only slightly more substantial than the rather insigni-
ficant amounts attributable to county government. 0 Federal aid
to Nebraska education is characteristically categorical, being
granted to achieve specific purposes. The presence of conditions
and initiative found at the local levels often determines the amount
of federal funding a district will receive from the United States
Office of Education. Participation requirements for local and state
action in federal programs as subject to program and inter-
pretive changes. In addition to federal funds from other sources, 151
Nebraska receives federal aid to impacted areas' 52 and funds arising
from the Flood Control Act of 1954,153 Forest Reserve Funds, 54
the sale of salvaged property shall be paid into the county treasury
for the benefit of the school fund of the county.
150. 1970 GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 118; Appendix, Exhibit A.
151. Appendix, Exhibit A.
152. Federal acts provide assistance to those local educational agencies
upon which the United States has placed a financial burden by rea-
son of federal activities being carried on therein.
The Educational Agencies Financial Aid Act §§ 1-9, 20 U.S.C. §§
236-44 (1970), specifies the kinds of situations in which the special as-
sistance is intended to be provided, the principal ones being (1)
where the local sources of revenue to such an agency have been di-
minished as a result of the acquisition of real property by the United
States § 2 of the Act, 20 U.S.C. § 237); (2) where the local agency
provides education for children residing on federal property in the
area (§ 3 (a) of the Act, 20 U.S.C. § 238 (a)); and (3) where the local
agency also provides education for children whose parents are em-
ployed on such property (§ 3 (b) of the Act, 20 U.S.C. § 238 (b)).
Act of Sept. 23, 1950, 20 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1970), relates to the
needed construction within a school district brought about by the in-
flux of a large amount of children caused by government activities.
Both acts authorize Federal payments directly to the eligible local
educational agencies. Applications for assistance under both laws are
submitted to the U.S. Office of Education through the state education
agencies, which certify that the data contained therein is accurate
insofar as state records are concerned. Sixty-four Nebraska school
districts received $5,776,896 in the 1969-1970 school year from the
former act, and $424,085 from the latter. 1970 GovERNoR's REPORT 28.
153. Flood Control Act of 1954 § 206, 33 U.S.C. § 701c-3 (1970) provides:
"75 per centum of all moneys received and deposited in the Treasury
of the United States during any fiscal year on account of the leasing
of lands acquired by the United States for flood control, navigation
and allied programs, including the development of hydroelectric
power, shall be paid at the end of such year by the Secretary of the
Treasury to the State in which such property is situated, to be ex-
pended as the State legislature may prescribe for the benefit of pub-
lic schools and public roads of the county, or counties, in which
such property is situated, or for defraying any of the expenses of
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the Taylor Grazing Act,15 5 the Mineral Lands Leasing Act,' 5 and
the Migratory Bird Conservation Act.157
county government in such county or counties .... " Ns. REV. STAT.
§ 79-1315 to -1319 (Reissue 1971) defines state procedure for the
distribution of funds paid by the United States for flood control pur-
poses in Nebraska to the counties of the state for the benefit of the
public schools and public roads of such counties.
154. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3913, 34 Stat. 684 provides: "That ten per
centum of all money received from each forest reserve during any
fiscal year . . .shall be paid at the end thereof by the Secretary of
the Treasury to the State or Territory in which said reserve is
situated, to be expended as the State or Territorial legislature may
may prescribe for the benefit of the public schools and public roads
of the county or counties in which the forest reserve is situated
.... " NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1309 to -1311 (Reissue 1971) set forth
the state procedure for receiving such funds and for their distribution
to school districts and county public road funds.
155. Taylor Grazing Act §§ 1-2, 43 U.S.C. § 315i (1970) provides: "(a)
12 %k per centum of the moneys collected as grazing fees under sec-
tion 315b of this title during any fiscal year [§ 315b authorizes the Sec-
retary of the Interior to issue permits to graze livestock on grazing
districts upon the payment of annual fees] shall be paid at the end
thereof by the Secretary of the Treasury to the State in which the
grazing districts producing such moneys are situated. . . (b) 25 per
centum of all moneys collected under section 315m of this title during
any fiscal year when appropriated by the Congress, [§ 315m authforizes
the Secretary of the Interior to lease isolated or disconnected tracts
of the public domain for grazing purposes] shall be available until
expended solely for the construction, purchase, or maintenance of
range improvements; and 50 per centum of all moneys collected un-
der said section during any fiscal year shall be paid at the end
thereof by the Secretary of the Treasury to the State in which the
lands producing such moneys are located, to be expended as the State
legislature of such State may prescribe for the benefit of the county
or counties in which the lands producing such moneys are located."
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 79-1312 to -13 (Reissue 1971) provides the procedure
for the distribution of such funds and their apportionment to help
support and maintain a county school library.
156. Mineral Lands Leasing Act § 35, 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1970) provides:
"All money received from sales, bonuses, royalties, and rentals of
public lands under the provision of this chapter shall be paid into
the Treasury of the United States; 37 per centum thereof shall be
paid by the Secretary of the Treasury ... to the State within the
boundaries of which the leased lands or deposits are or were located;
said moneys to be used by such State or subdivisions thereof for the
construction and maintenance of public roads or for the support of
public schools or other public educational institutes, as the legislature
of the State may direct . . . ." NEs. REv. STAT. § 79-1328 (Reissue
1971) recognizes the state level acceptance of such funds and places
such funds in the Permanent School Fund for the state.
157. Migratory Bird Conservation Act § 401, 16 U.S.C. § 715s (1970)
provides generally that 25% of all money received during each fiscal
year from the sale or other disposition of surplus wildlife, timber,
hay, grass, or other spontaneous products of the soil, shell, sand, or
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IV. STATE REVENUE
The State of Nebraska provides direct financial aid to local
schools through: state apportionment funds,'5 8 in-lieu-of school
land taxes,159 insurance premium taxes,160 state appropriations,
and state aid.16 ' State apportionment funds' 62 are gathered from
several sources. However, the main contributing source is the in-
terest derived from over $42 million of permanent school fund
bonds and from the lease rentals of school lands. 63 In-lieu-of
school land tax funds' 64 are distributed to local schools on the
basis of tax income lost due to the acres of non-taxable school
land in each district. The in-lieu-of school land taxes are a first
lien on the temporary school fund. Districts which contract to
receive educational services are not eligible to receive in-lieu-of
school land tax money. Thirty per cent of the funds derived from
the insurance premium tax'6 5 of two per cent on the gross pre-
miums of foreign insurance companies who do business in the state
are diverted from the State General Fund to the Nebraska school
general fund for educational purposes. Funds comprising the
category of state appropriations are distributed on the basis of
qualified special programs: driver education, etc. These funds
are appropriated by the legislature from the State General Fund.
V. STATE AiD
A. The State Aid Plan
State aid to education, which accounts for the vast majority
of direct state financial aid to local schools, is a relatively new
concept in Nebraska. In order to effectuate a transfer of the
property tax burden to a sales and income tax and to approach
greater equality of financial ability to support education among
the various school districts, the School Foundation and Equali-
zation Act 6 6 was enacted by the Nebraska Unicameral in 1967.
Money distributed to local school districts under the School Foun-
gravel shall be paid at the end of such year by the Secretary of the
Treasury to the county or counties in which such refuge is found.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-423 (Reissue 1968) gives the state's consent to the
establishment of migratory bird reserves in Nebraska.
158. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1302 to -1304 (Reissue 1971).
159. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1302 (Reissue 1971).
160. Nra. REV. STAT. § 77-908 (Reissue 1971).
161. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1330 to -1344 (Reissue 1971).
162. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 79-1302 to -1304 (Reissue 1971).
163. NEB. CONST. art. VII, §§ 3-4.
164. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1302 (Reissue 1971).
165. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-908 (Reissue 1971).
166. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 79-1330 to -44 (Reissue 1971).
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dation and Equalization Act is derived from the State General
Fund and financed primarily from state income and sales tax reve-
nues. The Act consists of several criteria for determining an in-
dividual school district's portion of aid and a series of priorities
for use when the program is not fully funded. Factors affecting
the amount of state aid available to a district under the School
Foundation and Equalization Act include grade level per A.D.M., 16' 7
district eligibility requirements,' 68  assessed valuation,' 69  staff
qualifications, 70 educational programs,17' transportation,'7 2 pop-
ulation density,173 and increased school district membership. 7 4
The School Foundation and Equalization Act provides that
all public school districts1 75 shall receive some aid allocated on
the basis of average daily membership by grade groupings. This
provision of the Act 1 76 directs each district to be paid seventeen
dollars and fifty cents per kindergarten pupil, thirty-five dollars
per pupil in grades one through six, forty-two dollars per pupil in
grades seven and eight, and forty-nine dollars per pupil in grades
nine through twelve. The applicable sum of each category is then
multiplied by the preceding year's average daily membership of
resident and nonresident pupils in each category. This section of
the act has been labeled "foundation aid" or the "foundation grant"
system.
To be eligible for all other aid provided by the School Founda-
tion and Equalization Act, each district must qualify for participa-
tion in the program by levying an ad valorem property tax at a
millage not less than the prescribed levels established by the
Act.'7 7 Class I districts must levy a tax of at least eight mills, 17s
167. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1334 (Reissue 1971). A.D.M. or Average Daily
Membership is the aggregate of attendance plus the aggregate days
of absence of a class of a school divided by the actual number of
days school was in session with pupils and teachers in attendance.
168. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1335 (Reissue 1971).
169. NEB. REB. STAT. §§ 79-1336, -1338 (Reissue 1971).
170. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1340 (1)- (3) (Reissue 1971).
171. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1337, -1340(4) (Reissue 1971).
172. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1337 (Reissue 1971).
173. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1336 (2) (Reissue 1971).
174. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1331.01 (Reissue 1971).
175. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1331 (2) (Reissue 1971) provides: "District shall
mean a school district approved for continued legal operation under
rules and regulations established by the State Board of Education
pursuant to subdivision (c), subsection (5) of section 79-328."
176. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1334 (Reissue 1971).
177. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1335 (Reissue 1971). NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1333(Reissue 1971) provides also that all financial assistance to school dis-
tricts pursuant to the School Foundation and Equalization Act shall bebased upon the annual financial reports required by § 79-451. Section79-1333 sets forth the dates such reports are due and articulates the
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Class II, III, IV and V districts must levy a tax of at least twelve
mills' 79 and Class VI districts must levy a tax of at least five
nmills.'8 For each district which qualifies by levying the pre-
scribed mill levy, the state will insure such district a minimum level
of financial support,'"" an amount which has become known to a
qualifying district as its "insured need." The levels of "insured
need" for those qualifying districts are two hundred twenty-five
dollars per kindergarten pupil, four hundred fifty dollars per
pupil in grades one through six, five hundred dollars per pupil in
grades seven and eight, and five hundred fifty dollars per pupil
in grades nine through twelve.
Under the Act a school district's amount of aid is also made a
function of five other factors: gifted pupil programs,182 deprived
pupil programs, 8 3 transportation cost, 84 population density 8 5 and
increasing pupil membership. 8 6 Districts having special pro-
grams approved by the State Board of Education for gifted chil-
dren and for culturally and educationally deprived children are en-
titled to have pupils enrolled in such programs "weighed" so as
to correspondingly increase such district's "insured need" calcula-
tion.' 87 The "weighing" of pupils in calculating a district's "in-
sured need" is also used under the Act in recognizing the factor
of transportation expenses, 8 8 i.e., to help finance the transporta-
tion costs of pupils residing over four miles from school.
When the population density in any county is less than four
persons per square mile the "insured need" of each district in such
county is increased from as much as ten to forty per cent. 89 Be-
penalties which accrue when such filing dates are missed. Failure to
submit an annual financial report will result in the forfeiture of all
assistance under the Act for that fiscal year.
178. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1335 (1) (Reissue 1971).
179. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1335 (2) (Reissue 1971).
180. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1335 (3) (Reissue 1971).
181. NFB. Ray. STAT. § 79-1336 (Reissue 1971).
182. N s. REV. STAT. § 79-1337 (Reissue 1971).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1336 (2) (Reissue 1971).
186. N s. REv. STAT. § 79-1333.01 (Reissue 1971).
187. Ns. REv. STAT. § 79-1337 (Reissue 1971) provides that in calculating
"insured need" a district with an approved special program for
gifted children, or culturally deprived children, shall be entitled to
count each pupil enrolled in such programs during the preceding
year as one and one-fourth and two students respectively.
188. Id.
189. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1336(2) (Reissue 1971) provides: "(a) If the
population density is three or more but less than four persons per
square mile, ten per cent; (b) if the density is two or more but less
than three persons per square mile, twenty per cent; (c) if the den-
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cause the "insured need" calculations of a district are based on the
previous year's pupil membership figures, it is possible that a dis-
trict's share of aid under the Act would be insufficient to meet
current needs because of a substantial increase in pupil member-
ship. In instances where such an increase can be shown, the Act
provides that the "insured need" of the district may be increased
by the percentage of the increase in pupil membership over the
previous year.1 90
The "insured" sum due a qualifying district is determined by
multiplying the applicable "insured need" for each category of
students by the average daily membership for the preceding year
of both resident and nonresident pupils in each category. From
this sum the district must subtract operating funds 91 obtained
from (i) "foundation grants,"1 92 (ii) the qualifying mill levy,193
(iii) tuition, 94 (iv) fines, 195 (v) license fees,196 (vi) transportation
reimbursements, 97 (vii) the Insurance Tax Fund 198 and various
other funds. 199 If the insured need exceeds the calculated figure,
the district is entitled to receive the difference.20 0  This amount is
known as "equalization aid." The net effect of this portion of the
state aid program is the distribution of funds in a way so as to pro-
vide the greatest amounts to the school districts with the lowest
property tax base per A.D.M.
In addition to foundation and equalization aid the Act provides
for state sharing in the costs of teachers with advanced degrees
2 01
sity is one or more but less than two persons per square mile, thirty
per cent; and (d) if the density is less than one person per square mile,
forty per cent; Provided, any school district within a qualifying county
showing a density greater than provided in this subdivision shall
not qualify for such percentage increases."
190. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1333.01 (Reissue 1971).
191. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1331 (Reissue 1971) provides: "Operating funds
shall mean a district's current operating revenue for the preceding fis-
cal year as shown in the district's annual financial report to the State
Department of Education." NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-451 (Reissue 1971)
provides that at the close of each fiscal year school districts must
file an annual financial report which shows their sources of income
and the purpose of their expenditures.
192. Nss. REV. STAT. § 79-1338(1) (Reissue 1971).
193. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1338(2) (Reissue 1971). However, funds re-
ceived from the portion of the local tax levy which exceeds the mini-
mum qualifying levy are not included in this computation.
194. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1338(3) (Reissue 1971).
195. NF. REv. STAT. § 79-1338(4) (Reissue 1971).
196. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1338(5) (Reissue 1971).
197. NFB. REv. STAT. § 79-1338 (6) (Reissue 1971).
198. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1338 (7) (Reissue 1971).
199. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1338 (8)-(9) (Reissue 1971).
200. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1339 (Reissue 1971).
201. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1340(1)-(3) (Reissue 1971).
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and summer school programs.20 2  Funds allocated for the en-
couragement of local school district action in these areas have been
labeled "incentive funds." Under the terms of the Act each dis-
trict is entitled to (i) three hundred fifty dollars for each certi-
fied instructor 20 3 holding a doctorate degree; 20 4 (ii) two hundred
fifty dollars for each certified instructor having completed an ap-
proved six-year college program, or holding a master's degree or
the equivalent;20 5 (iii) one hundred fifty dollars for each certified
instructor holding a bachelor's degree20 6 and (iv) twenty cents per
student hour for each student participating in a summer school
program..2 07
Because the School Foundation and Equalization Act has not
been fully funded by the Nebraska Unicameral, the Act also estab-
lishes priorities for the funding of the various parts of the Act as
funds become available. First priority is given to funds for "foun-
dation aid,"20 8 the flat grant provision of the Act to be made with-
out regard to need or local tax efforts. Foundation aid is not pro-
rated; each district is guaranteed their total amount of foundation
aid.2 0 9  The second priority on available funds is vested in the
staff qualification and summer school programs comprising the
"incentive aid" provisions of the Act.2 10 Finally, third priority
rests with the "equalization aid" sections of the Act.2 1 1 In times
when the Act is not fully funded, the State Board of Education is
to apportion the available funds among the qualifying districts.2
1 2
202. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1340(4) (Reissue 1971).
203. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1331(1) (Reissue 1971) provides: "Classroom
teacher shall mean a certified teacher who has major responsibility
for the instruction of one or more classes of pupils."
204. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1340(1) (Reissue 1971).
205. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1340 (2) (Reissue 1971).
206. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1340 (3) (Reissue 1971).
207. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1340(4) (Reissue 1971). NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-
1331 (5) (Reissue 1971) provides: "Summer school program shall
mean a program consisting of thirty days of school at least three
hours per day, or the equivalent, conducted by a district to meet the
academic needs of its pupils during a period other than the regular
school year."
208. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1343 (Reissue 1971).
209. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1344.01 (Reissue 1971).
210. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1343 (Reissue 1971).
211. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1338, -1339 (Reissue 1971).
212. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1342 (Reissue 1971). It should be noted that the
priority system in operation divided the $35 million appropriated for
fiscal year 1969-1970 as follows:
First Priority (foundation aid) $12,714,729.02 36.33%
Second Priority (staff and summer school
incentive aid) 2,672,056.50 7.63%
Third Priority (equalization aid) 19,613,214.47 56.00%
1970 GovERNOR's REPORT S-42.
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B. The State Aid Effect
The influence of the School Foundation and Equalization Act as
applied to a seventh or eighth grade membership group in a Class
II through V district school is vividly presented by Graph A.
The state's share of the five hundred dollar "insured need" de-
creases as a school district's assessed valuation per A.D.M. in-
creases. The "wealthier" the district, the less the equalization
aid received by the district. Only the foundation aid block grant
of forty-two dollars per A.D.M. plus the additional staff qualifi-
cation and summer school allowances of incentive aid (not shown)
would be paid to those districts having a property tax base of
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Graph B portrays the impact of a partially funded School
Foundation and Equalization Act upon the equalization aid portion
of the Act. Graph B shows that a gross shortcoming of the Act
exists in that a district's share of equalization aid is greatly re-
duced when the legislature fails to completely fund the Act. As a
result, the partial funding leads to a greater monetary loss to the
"poor" school districts. A district with a low tax base of $5,000
per A.D.M. loses $253.50 per A.D.M. while a district with a high tax
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* C. Cale Hudson, Understanding Public School Finance in Nebraska
1971-1972, at 27 (1971).
Graph C demonstrates the failure to achieve any degree of
"true equalization" under the School Foundation and Equalization
Act when arbitrary insured need levels are used instead of true
program costs, a second gross shortcoming of the Act. The average
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cost per pupil A.D.M. in Nebraska during the 1969-1970 school
year was $648.213 Yet a fully funded Act insures only $500 per
seventh and eighth grade A.D.M.2 14 Graph C illustrates the effect
of arbitrary rather than actual A.D.M. unit cost figures on the local
mill levy rate in hypothetical districts "A," "B" and "C" if they de-
sire to spend at average expenditure levels. "Poor district A"
with an assessed valuation of $5,000 per A.D.M. must make roughly
five times the effort of "wealthy district C" with an assessed val-
uation of $30,000 per A.D.M. It should be noted that this effort
must be made on top of a fully funded state aid system. "Average
district B" with an assessed valuation of $15,000 per A.D.M. re-
quires a 9.9 mill levy increase above the 12 mill qualifying level
under a fully funded state aid program. Even "wealthy district
C" must tax an additional 5.9 mills above the 12 mill qualifying
level under a fully funded state aid program to meet the actual
average expenditure figure per A.D.M.
Graph C conclusively shows that there can in fact be no "true
equalization" under the Nebraska School Foundation and Equali-
zation Act when arbitrary program cost values are used in place
of actual program costs. When the Act is not fully funded there
is a complete absence of ability to achieve equalization.
VI. NEBRASKA'S CHOICE: JUDICIAL OR LEGISLATIVE RESTRUCTURING
A. The Nebraska System's Vulnerability to Constitutional At-
tack
A comparison of Nebraska's school financing system and those
systems invalidated by the courts in California, Minnesota, New
Jersey and Texas indicates that the Nebraska system is extremely
vulnerable to constitutional attack under the rationale of the "school
tax cases." Nebraska has more school districts than any other
state in the nation.2 15 The assessed valuation per resident pupil
in Class II-V school districts varies from $53,132.04 to $3,765.27,216
and mill levies vary from 73.59 mills to 18.78 mills. 2 17 Most im-
portantly, the per pupil expenditures in Nebraska school districts
varies from $521.98 to $1,660.46.21-8 As indicated in the previous
section, the state's present equalization aid program is incapable
213. 1970 GOVERNOR's REPORT S-30, -31, -42.
214. Fully funded insured need levels for each kindergarten A.D.M. unit
is $250; the level for grade one through six A.D.M. unit is $450;
and the level for grade nine through twelve A.D.M. unit is $550. NEB.
REv. STAT. § 79-1336(1) (Reissue 1971).
215. See Appendix, Exhibit D, infra.
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* C. Cale Hudson, Understanding Public School Finance in Nebraska
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of alleviating the effects of these disparities. Insofar as quality
of education is determined by fiscal considerations, the quality of
education in any given school district in Nebraska is plainly a
function of the wealth of the district as reflected by its assessed
real property values.
Thus, all of the elements that were held to constitute a denial
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braska's school financing system. A suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Nebraska system is currently pending in the United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska. 219  If the
state's school funding system remains in its present form, it is ex-
tremely likely that it may be invalidated by the courts in the near
future.
B. Legislative Restructuring
Recognizing the crisis in public educational financing, the re-
cently concluded Second Session of the Eighty-Second Nebraska
Legislature devoted a great deal of time to four new school fund-
ing proposals: LB 1377, LB 1159, LB 1418 and LB 730. Undoubt-
edly the recent school tax cases influenced the legislature to ini-
tiate plans for restructuring school financing in Nebraska. An-
other motivating factor was the desire to more equitably trans-
fer the burden of school financing from property taxes to the
sales and income taxes as begun by the School Foundation and
Equalization Act.
a. LB 1377220
LB 1377 would have repealed the School Foundation and Equal-
ization Act and established in the state treasury a Public School
Support Fund221 to be financed by state sales and income taxes.222
The bill would have lowered property taxes and increased the
state sales and income taxes. As does the School Foundation and
Equalization Act, LB 1377 contained several criteria for determin-
ing an individual school district's portion of state aid. Factors
affecting the amount of state aid available under LB 1377 in-
cluded A.D.M.,223 district eligibility requirements and assessed val-
uation,224 increased school district membership,225 increases in
number of staff,2 2 6 transportation costs, 227 program and curriculum
additions228 and population density.229
LB 1377 provided that all public school districts would have
219. Rupert v. Exon, Civil No. 72-0-142 (D. Neb., filed Feb. 11, 1972).
220. LB 1377 was passed by the Nebraska Legislature on March 23, 1972,
by a vote of 34 to 14. Nebraska Governor J. James Exon vetoed the
measure on March 28, 1972. The legislature failed to override the
Governor's veto by a vote 25 to 24 on March 29, 1972.
221. L.B. 1377 § 1, 2d Sess., 82d Neb. Leg. (1972).
222. Id. § 8.
223. Id. § 2.
224. Id.
225. Id. § 5.
226. Id. § 5(1).
227. Id. § 5 (2).
228. Id. § 5 (3).
229. Id. § 3 (2).
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received some aid allocated on the basis of average daily mem-
bership, at least a minimum of fifty dollars per year for each
pupil in average daily membership.230 The bill retained the
"foundation aid" or the "foundation grant" system found in the
School Foundation and Equalization Act.
To be eligible for all other aid provided by LB 1377, beginning
with the 1973-1974 school year, all districts must have qualified
for participation in the program by levying an ad valorem property
tax at a millage prescribed by the bill. Class II, III, IV and V
school districts would have been required to levy a property tax
of fourteen mills to qualify for state aid under the program.23 1
Class I and VI school districts, with grade schools and high schools
only, would have qualified with a lower mill levy.23 2 The quali-
fying levy would have been applied to all taxable property within
the school district for the general operation and maintenance of
the schools within the district.233 Districts, with some exceptions,
would have been held to their qualifying mill levy rate,23 4 so as to
provide a degree of control over rising local property tax levels.
Each year school districts would have been required to submit
their budgets to the State Department of Education. The bill pro-
vided that the Department of Education was not to allow a district
budgetary increase of more than six per cent per year.23 5 How-
ever, upon application by the local school district an exemption
to the six per cent ceiling level would have been granted by the
State Board of Education where the student membership of a dis-
trict had increased one half of one per cent or more above the
standard membership figures of the preceding year.23 6 Also, an
exemption might have been granted because of an increase in the
district's number of staff,237 transportation costs 238 or for new
programs and additions to the curriculum. 239  If an exemption
230. Id. § 2.
231. Id.
232. Id. § 2 provides that to qualify under the program, a Class I school
district must levy a tax of 6.00 mills, "except that for a Class I district
which is part of a Class VI district offering instruction in grades
seven to twelve the levy shall be four mills, and each Class VI district
eight mills, except that for a Class VI school district offering instruc-
tion in grades seven to twelve the levy shall be ten mills ......
233. Id. It should be reiterated that LB 1377 would effect only the prop-
erty tax levied for the school district's operating expenses. It would
not eliminate other levies for such purposes as bond retirement, con-
struction, pension, etc. See note 19 supra.
234. Id. §§ 4-5.
235. Id. § 4.
236. Id. § 5.
237. Id. § 5(1).
238. Id. § 5(2).
239. Id. § 5(3).
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was granted by the State Board of Education, the additional amount
of money budgeted beyond the six per cent limitation would have
been paid to the school district from funds appropriated by the
legislature to the Public School Support Fund.240
Regardless of an increase in funds which a school district
should have received from the Public School Support Fund due
to increased student membership and might have received due to
increased staff, transportation and curriculum costs, a school dis-
trict might have levied an additional tax of five mills in excess of
the qualifying levy upon a majority vote of the local district's
board of education after a public hearing on the proposed addi-
tional tax. 24 1 A further additional tax of an "open-end" amount
might have been levied if such amount was voted by a unanimous
school board or board of education or by a majority of the electors
of the district voting on the proposition at any general or special
election.2 42 In addition, if the Nebraska Legislature would have
failed for any year to make an appropriation sufficient to make
the payments to local school districts provided for in the bill, a
district might have levied an additional tax to produce revenue
equal to the difference between the amount to be received under
such appropriation and the amount that would have been received
if the bill were fully funded.2 43
To each district that qualified by levying the prescribed mill
levy, the state would have paid a specified level of financial sup-
port, an amount which has become known to the qualifying dis-
trict as its "insured need."244 The levels of "insured need" were
to be determined by the legislature by class of district.245 Thus
the amounts of "insured need per class of district" rested with
the discretion of the legislature, except such amount might never
have been less than the average of the following amounts: the
average per pupil cost for all classes of districts for the preceding
year and the cost per pupil in each school district for the preceding
year.
2 4 6
The total sum due a qualifying district was to be determined
by multiplying the applicable "insured need" for such class of dis-
trict by the number of pupils in average daily membership for
the preceding year.2 47 From this sum the school district was to
240. Id. § 5.
241. Id. § 6.
242. Id. § 6(1).
243. Id. § 6(2).
244. Id. § 7.
245. Id. § 3(1).
246. Id.
247. Id. § 7.
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subtract operating funds obtained from the qualifying mill levy 248
and the foundation grants.24 9 This end amount was known as the
"equalization aid."
Under the bill of a school district's share of state aid was also
made a function of population density. Where the population den-
sity in any school district was less than five persons per square
mile the total financial support due a district as equalization aid
was to be increased by certain specified percentages. 25
0
The estimated cost of LB 1377 was placed at $160 million a
year.25 1 To meet this cost would have necessitated a raise in the
sales tax of one and one-half per cent and a five per cent jump in
the state personal income tax rate. This would have raised the
current state sales tax rate from two and one-half per cent to four
per cent and the state income tax from the current fifteen per
cent of the taxpayer's federal liability to twenty per cent. By
1974-1975 there would have been need for additional state tax in-
creases.2 52 Although projections that far in advance are admittedly
difficult to make because of the unknown growth in the economy,
property valuations, school enrollments and other factors, an
estimate is that the state income tax rate might have had to jump
another two per cent.253 That would have made the individual
income tax rate twenty-two per cent, assuming the absence of any
other new non-educational state spending programs which would
have effected the rate. This would have meant that by the
1974-1975 school year, the state sales tax would have been in-
creased by fifty-three per cent and the state income tax rate by
forty-six per cent to finance the Public School Support Fund.254
LB 1377 would have brought about a considerable shifting of
the present total tax burden as shown by Chart A, infra. A
higher total tax bill would probably have been paid by those
whose homes had a market value that is low in comparison to the
owner's income, those who rented unless their landlords passed
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. § 3 (2). If the density is 4 or more but less than 5 persons per
square mile, the insured need is increased by 10%. LB 1377 § 3 (2) (a).
If the density is 3 or more but less than 4 persons per square mile, the
insured need is increased by 15%. LB 1377 § 3 (2) (b). If the density
is 2 or more but less than 3 persons per square mile, the insured
need is increased by 20%. LB 1377 § 3(2) (c). If the density is one
or more but less than 2 persons per square mile, the insured need is
increased by 25%. LB 1377 § 3(2) (d). If the density is less than one
person per square mile, the insured need is increased by 30%. LB
1377 § 3 (2) (e).
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on his reduction in property taxes by reducing rent rates, those
who owned property in a school district which had a low millage
and those corporations which owned little or no property. In-
cluded in the group of those who would have probably been most
benefited by LB 1377 are corporations owning a large amount of
property in comparison to before tax profits, those owning homes
having a high market value in relation to their income and those
owning property in a school district which presently has a high
millage rate.
As an example of how the tax burden would have shifted un-
der LB 1377, imagine a family of four residing in the Omaha
School District with an income of $10,000 per year and a home
valued at $23,000. The house is appraised at approximately eighty-
three per cent of it's actual market value from which the home-
stead exemption of $800 is deducted.25 5  The house is then as-
sessed at thirty-five per cent of appraised value256 and added to
the tax rolls. The Omaha Board of Education levied 54.63 mills to
operate the Omaha School District for the 1971-1972 school year2 57
and 1.06 mills for the Omaha Technical College 258 for a total of
55.69 mills. 259
Chart A shows that the hypothetical family's 1971-1972 school
tax would be $356. Its state income tax and sales tax for 1971
equals $135 and $114 respectively.260 The total state school, sales
and income tax for such a family would be $605. Under LB 1377
the identical family would have paid $197 state income tax and
$182 in state sales tax. The school mill levy would have dropped
to 23.26 mills if the school board had held the operating limit to
fourteen mills. If the school board had adopted a levy of nineteen
mills, the millage would have dropped to 28.26 mills. The corre-
sponding property tax assessed would have decreased from $148
to $180. With a fourteen mill operating limit total state school,
sales and income taxes would have been $527; a reduction of nearly
twelve per cent. With a nineteen mill operating limit, there would
have been a seven and one-half per cent reduction in total state
property, sales and income taxes to a total of $559.
255. NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-202.13(2) (Reissue 1971) provides that there
shall be exempt from taxation the first 20% of the first $4,000 of the
actual value of a homestead having an actual value in excess of $1,500.
256. NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-201 (Reissue 1971).
257. NEBRASKA STATE DEP'T OF EDUCATION, NEBRASKA EDUCATIONAL DI-
RECTORY 213 (1971-1972); Appendix, Exhibit B.
258. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1445.30 (Reissue 1971).
259. Of that total, 46.43 mills are for actual operating expenses, and 8.20
mills are for bond retirements, construction and employee pension
plans. See, note 134 supra.
260. State income and sales tax figures are computed from standard fed-
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b. LB 1159, LB 1418 and LB 730
LB 1159 would have increased the state sales tax by one
cent. The sales tax increase would then have been combined
with an equivalent rise in the state income tax to produce $76 mil-
lion of financial aid to schools. 26
1
LB 1518, which never advanced to the final reading stage,
would have kept the School Foundation and Equalization Act in-
tact but increased the current level of funding from $35 million
to $89 million per year.
LB 730 was a constitutional amendment seeking state pay-
ment of the salaries of local school teachers, administrators and
employees. Such a proposal would have cost an additional $170
million and have required the state sales tax rate raised by three
per cent and the state personal income tax rate raised by twelve
per cent.262
PART THREE: ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE
As evidenced by the increasing number of "school-tax cases"
being filed in courts throughout the country, a school-tax revolt
has begun to rumble across the nation. The property tax is the
bane. In addition, beneath the ripples of revolt can be detected a
layer of class animosity similar to that found at comparable stages
in the development of the segregated education and apportionment
issues.263
As the opinions in the school tax cases have repeatedly empha-
sized, a central element in the school-tax revolt has been the de-
termination that while every community shall have the right to as-
sess its citizens a higher amount of taxes for education than a
neighboring community if it so chooses, the tax base clearly
limits the amount that a community can raise, no matter how hard
it tries, as long as educational funding relies primarily on the prop-
erty tax for its support. The courts are in substantial agreement
that tax base limitations mean that children in "poor" localities
will, to the extent that educational quality depends on finance,
be denied adequate educational opportunities while children in
"wealthy" localities will increase even further the gap between
261. Omaha World-Herald, March 18, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
262. Omaha World-Herald, March 24, 1972, at 1, col. 7 (Morning Neb.
ed.).
263. A certain degree of blue-collar resentment of white-collar educational
elitism is becoming increasingly visible as in many instances the
supporters of the schools tend to be from the more educated and
wealthier classes. School tax critics largely represent the less affluent.
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themselves and their less fortunate neighbors. Furthermore, the
courts have shown, as the Nebraska statistics verify, that differ-
ences in taxable wealth among school districts do produce in-
equities not erased by state aid equalization plans. Yet the courts,
probably not forgetful of the increased workload they assumed and
of the criticism directed at them when they accepted a quasi-legis-
lative function ten years ago in the apportionment cases, have
been careful not to endorse an alternative financing plan or an or-
dered restructuring pursuant to any proposed general plan.
Various alternatives have been suggested to achieve basic equal-
ity in local education. Four alternatives2 64 frequently mentioned
are: (i) a redistribution of the local property tax on an equal,
statewide basis to provide a minimum basic educational program
but allowing the communities to tax themselves for certain extras;"
(ii) a unitary, state-wide educational system of strict equality
with no extras, a sort of "one-child, one-dollar" concept; (iii) a
focus on equal education rather than on expenditures with the
state supplementing local dollars; and (iv) a concentration on edu-
cational achievement where each child's needs would be measured
and where the costs would vary with the need.2 65  In addition,
there is the "fiscal neutrality" concept which would allow state
legislators a free hand in restructuring school finance systems, ex-
cept for the single requirement that the quality of education of-
fered to the state's school children shall not be a function of
wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a whole. As stated
earlier in this article, this principal received tacit support in the Ser-
rano decision and was cited in the Minnesota and Texas school tax
cases as a standard by which legislatures could restructure existing
funding systems in compliance with the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. No one plan has of yet won a clear-cut
consensus of support. Lack of action can be attributed to two
main causes: lack of funds and eager anticipation of a federal plan.
While most Americans might agree that inequity exists it is
just as plain that middle-income America would bitterly oppose an
effort to resolve the problem by having the state, rather than local
government, raise and distribute the property tax. Suburban and
rural property taxes would skyrocket in order to equalize per-pu-
pil expenditures with the cities. 266 There would also be high de-
264. New York Times, Sept. 2, .1971, at 55, col. 2.
265. As an example, it might cost more under this alternative to provide
an equal educational opportunity to physically handicapped or cul-
turally deprived children than to so-called "normal" children.
266. However, if property tax rates between districts were to be equalized
in Nebraska it would remove one of the biggest obstacles to school
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grees of agitation if state income and sales taxes were hiked in
order to put more funds at the disposal of persons in poor dis-
tricts. Although income and sales taxes are more broadly based
than the property tax, such a solution would exaggerate the dif-
ferences already in existence between wealthy and poor states.
Any solution depends on the skill and imagination of the plan-
ner; however, his work is dependent on money, and the money is
dependent on the taxpayer. The eventual, realistic solution de-
pends on the spending of more public funds to provide equaliza-
tion. There has been little indication of public interest in provid-
ing these funds in a time of inflation.
An urgent desire to effectuate a rapid solution to the problem
has also been hindered by anticipation of a federal proposal. A
wait-and-see attitude had been expressed by many who had spent
two years awaiting the March 1972 report and recommendations
of the President's Commission on School Finance.267  The anticipa-
tion of these and many other observers was heightened by Presi-
dent Nixon's State of the Union Message when he asked the bi-
partisan Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to
review the crisis in school finance and property taxes.268  Expec-
district reorganization and consolidation in Nebraska, i.e., the low
millage enjoyed by some districts.
267. Exec. Order No. 11513, 3 C.F.R. 102 (Comp. 1970).
268. 118 CONG. REc. 145, 147 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1972) (State of the
Union Message of President Nixon) provided:
"In addition, there is one pressing need which I have not previ-
ously covered, but which must be placed on the national agenda.
We long have looked to the local property tax as the main source
of financing for public primary and secondary education.
As a result, soaring school costs and soaring property tax rates
now threaten both our communities and our schools. They threaten
communities because property taxes-which more than doubled in the
last 10 years from 1960 to 1970-have become one of the most oppres-
sive and discriminatory of taxes, hitting most cruelly at the elderly
and the retired; and they threaten schools, as hard-pressed voters
understandingly reject new bond issues at the polls.
The problem has been given even greater urgency by three recent
court decisions, which have held the conventional method of financ-
ing schools through local property taxes discriminatory and uncon-
stitutional.
Nearly two years ago, I named a special Presidential Commission
to study the problems of school finance, and I also directed the Fed-
eral Departments to look into the same problems. We are developing
comprehensive proposals to meet these problems.
This issue involves two complex and interrelated sets of problems:
support of the schools, and the basic relationships of Federal, State
and local governments in any tax reforms.
Under the leadership of the Secretary of the Treasury, we are
carefully reviewing the tax aspects; and I have this week enlisted the
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tations were that a federal value-added tax,269 a national sales tax
in disguise, might be proposed as a means of raising $10 billion to
$12 billion in increased federal aid to education funds.
However, the recently released Report of the President's Com-
mission on School Finance, Schools, People, and Money,270 headed
by industrialist Neil McElroy, hardly mentioned the value-added
tax as a remedy to the funding crisis. Instead of recommending
revolutionary new revenue sources, the Commission suggested that
more school money be raised from existing sources with less reli-
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relation in addressing the
intergovernmental relations aspects.
I have asked the bipartisan Commission to review our proposals
for Federal action to cope with the gathering crisis of school finance
and property taxes. Later in the year, when both Commissions have
completed their studies, I shall make my final recommendations for
relieving the burden of property taxes and providing both fair and
adequate financing of our children's education.
All my recommendations, however, will be rooted in one funda-
mental principle with which there can be no compromise: local school
boards must have control over local schools."
It is interesting to note that after the President's message, U.S. Ed-
ucation Commissioner Sidney P. Marland stated that the administra-
tion was seriously considering a plan which would equalize educa-
tional spending per pupil between states, as well as within a single
state. While the interstate equity issue would not come under the
purview of the equal protection clause, it is indicative of interest
which the federal government has taken in the area of school finance.
Lincoln Evening Journal, Feb. 25, 1972, at 2, col. 3.
269. A two per cent Federal value-added tax (VAT) would work some-
thing like this: Company X provides raw material worth $100 to
Company Y including a 2 per cent tax, or $2, which it sends to
Washington. Company Y fashions the raw material into a product
which it sells to Company Z, a retailer, for $200. It includes tax of
2 per cent on the value it has added to the raw material, another
$2. The retailer sells it to the consumer for $220, including in that price
2 per cent of the value he added, 40 cents. Together, the three
businessmen send a total of $4.40 to Washington in tax money, ex-
actly the same amount a customer would pay at the end of the line
on a $220 product through a 2 per cent sales tax. In fact, there is
hardly any difference between a VAT and a national sales tax. The
big difference is that the final customer is not aware of the VAT
since it is hidden in the sales price, and he is therefore not as upset
with the VAT system as with a sales tax which is added in his pres-
ence.
Opponents of the value-added tax argue that it is regressive, hitting
poorer people proportionately harder than richer people. Propo-
nents of the VAT do not argue this point but instead reason that it
would merely be replacing another regressive tax, the property tax,
for the progressive purpose of 'providing equal educational oppor-
tunity.
270. ScHooLs, PEOPLE, & MoNEY (1972).
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ance on the local property tax. The Commission recommended
shifting the burden of school financing from local communities to
the states and raising more funds from state sales, personal and
corporate income taxes.
Instead of a large financial underwriting of public education,
the McElroy Report recommended that the Federal Government
play a deliberate role in future policy experimentation, spending
only $4.6 billion to $7.8 billion over a five year period as incentive
payments to urge the assumption of full school financing by the
states. Under such a program the states would be reimbursed by
the Federal Government for part of the cost of increasing their
own share of educational expenditures over a five year transi-
tional period.
The Commission also recommended equalizing educational op-
portunity rather than the equalization of educational expendi-
tures throughout a state. If implemented, such a proposal would
channel increased aid to the disadvantaged and handicapped chil-
dren in accordance with a yet to be created index of educational
needs. Such an index would recognize the existing variations in
the cost of providing comparable levels of education from one
geographical locale to another.
The Commission recognized that the equalization of educational
opportunity can be brought about by either one of two different
financing methods: "leveling up" or "leveling down." "Leveling
up" entails the raising of expenditures in all districts to meet the
level of the district with the highest expenditure, while "leveling
down" means bringing the districts with high expenditure levels
down to a lower equalized level. The Commission suggested that
equal educational opportunity be provided by the more expensive
"leveling up" process than by the less expensive "leveling down"
process.
If adopted, the Commission's recommendations could lead to sig-
nificant changes in shifting tax burdens, teacher-administrative
bargainings, school improvements, integration and local control
of education. While property owners would receive a measurable
degree of property tax relief, they will just as surely face higher
sales and income tax rates. Therefore, as educational costs con-
tinue to rise year after year, there can be no true tax relief. As an
easily foreseeable consequence of the assumption of greater ed-
ucational financing by the state, teachers will be able to direct their
full organizational bargaining power at one statehouse rather
than at numerous separable school boards. Larger state-wide
teachers' contracts could be the result as for the first time teach-
ers can effectively threaten massive state-wide strikes.
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Students attending school in presently labeled "poor" tax dis-
tricts may see massive improvements in their school buildings
and furnishings, while those in presently labeled "wealthy" dis-
tricts may have to accept a status quo arrangement until the
completion of a "leveling up" process is concluded. However,
the presence of more money in the "poor" districts might reduce
the desire for school busing if it is determined that "quality ed-
ucation" is attainable without busing.
Finally, if states do assume larger and larger portions of what
was once the burden of local financing, the fear is that the states
will also assume larger and larger portions of what was once local
control of education. Proponents of increased state financing
maintain that local boards of education will still be in a position
to exercise wide latitude, within general state guidelines, to use
the funds provided by the state in ways that best suit their 'local
demands. Opponents argue that if the state is going to predomi-
nantly finance the operating budgets of schools over the entire
state, naturally it is going to have a very dominant voice in say-
ing what goes into such budgets. Opponents see the result as an
end to locally-controlled schools and the beginning of a single state
system of education run from the statehouse. 27 1
CONCLUSION
By the very nature of the school tax cases it is impossible to
reach any definitive conclusions at this time. What we are pres-
ently witnessing is the demise of the property tax brought about
by a combination of strong political and legal forces. The signifi-
cance of the school tax cases is the signaling of the beginning of
a new era in the American system of public school finance, a be-
ginning that may stretch out for an entire decade. The rationale
supporting the coming drastic change has emerged; a satisfactory
plan to implement that rationale has yet to appear.
Kenneth Stephan '73
Richard Wegener '73
271. A belief that increased state aid will lead to controls may not be only
the view of opponents to increased state educational aid, but also
the view of realists. As Nebraska State Senator Terry Carpenter
said when discussing Nebraska's proposed massive state aid to educa-
tion bill, LB 1377, "Does anybody think that if we pass this bill and
turn all this money over to the districts we won't put any con-
trols on it?" Omaha World-Herald, March 18, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
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APPENDIX
EXHIBIT A
NEBRASKA SCHOOL DISTRICT's RECEIPTS OF THE GENERAL FuND
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1969-1970*
REVENUE RECEIPTS TOTALS
Local Sources
Local district taxes ----------------- --- $158,062,677.33
Public power district taxes ---------.......----.--------- 815,557.68
Local license fees ------------------------------------------------- - 527,434.84
Police court fines - - ----------- ------ 1,444,528.77
Tuition paid by districts --------------------- 2,570,303.15
Transportation paid by districts ----------------------- -------- 246,853.99
Tuition paid by individuals ---.................-------------- ... 311,659.40
Transportation paid by individuals -------------- 113,021.21
Other local revenue receipts ---.............------------ ------- 1,698,823.04
County Sources
Free high school tuition - --------- 8,751,453.66
Fines and license fees -------- ..................----------------------- 1,736,759.05












*THE ANNuAL IREPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION TO THE GOVERNOR
OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA FOR THE FISCAL YEAR COMMENCING JULY 1,




For school lunch and milk
Elem. & Sec. Educ. Act, Title I
Elem. & Sec. Educ. Act, Title II
Elern & Sec. Educ. Act, Title III
From other federal sources
National Defense Education Act
TOTAL REVENUE RECEIPTS
NON-REVENUE RECEIPTS
Sale of funding bonds
Current loans
Insurance adjustments

















Transfers from other funds - 6,356,370.67
TOTAL RECEIPTS, ALL SOURCES -$255,391,920.00
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Exm= C
NUMBER OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS BY COUNTY AS OF SEPTEMBER 15, 1971*
Class I Class II Class I Class Class TOTAL
County Districts Districts Districts IV & V VI
Adams 12 1 2 0 1 16
Antelope 25 3 1 0 0 29
Arthur 10 0 0 0 1 11
Banner 0 0 1 0 0 1
Blaine 0 0 1 0 0 1
Boone 21 2 2 0 0 25
Box Butte 14 0 2 0 0 16
Boyd 2 2 2 0 0 6
Brown 22 0 1 0 0 23
Buffalo 18 2 5 0 0 25
Burt 24 1 3 0 0 28
Butler 16 1 2 0 0 19
Cass 16 2 4 0 0 22
Cedar 11 0 5 0 0 16
Chase 6 0 1 0 1 8
Cherry 35 1 0 0 1 37
Cheyenne 13 3 2 0 0 18
Clay 2 1 4 0 0 7
Colfax 11 0 3 0 1 15
Cuming 28 2 2 0 0 32
Custer 25 2 5 0 0 32
Dakota 3 0 2 0 0 5
Dawes 18 0 2 0 0 20
Dawson 31 1 5 0 0 37
Deuel 0 0 2 0 0 2
Dixon 12 0 5 0 0 17
Dodge 28 1 3 0 2 34
Douglas 8 1 6 1 0 16
Dundy 0 1 1 0 0 2
Fillmore 2 2 4 0 0 8
Franklin 5 2 1 0 0 8
Frontier 5 1 1 0 1 8
Furnas 2 2 4 0 0 8
Gage 2 2 4 0 0 8
THE NEB. STATE COMM.* NEBRAsKcA STATE DEP'T. OF EDUCATION, REPORT OF
FOR SCHOOL DIST. REORGANIZATION (1971).
FINANCING PUBLIC EDUCATION
Garden 17 0 0 0 2 19
Garfield 9 0 0 0 1 10
Gosper 2 1 0 0 0 3
Grant 7 0 0 0 1 8
Greeley 6 2 2 0 0 10
Hall 21 1 1 0 2 25
Hamilton 1 3 2 0 0 6
Harlan 3 2 2 0 0 7
Hayes 4 0 0 0 1 5
Hitchcock 0 2 2 0 0 4
Holt 59 2 2 0 1 64
Hooker 0 0 1 0 0 1
Howard 7 1 2 0 0 10
Jefferson 13 1 2 0 0 16
Johnson 7 2 2 0 0 11
Kearney 2 0 3 0 0 5
Keith 22 2 1 0 0 25
Keya Paha 12 0 0 0 1 13
Kimball 6 2 0 0 1 9
Knox 6 0 6 0 0 12
Lancaster 13 1 3 1 0 18
Lincoln 21 3 3 0 0 27
Logan 0 0 1 0 0 1
Loup 8 0 0 0 1 9
Madison 24 0 5 0 0 29
McPherson 8 0 0 0 1 9
Merrick 5 2 2 0 0 9
Morrill 13 0 2 0 0 15
Nance 16 0 2 0 0 18
Nemaha 7 0 2 0 0 9
Nuckolls 10 2 3 0 0 15
Otoe 25 1 3 0 0 29
Pawnee 3 2 1 0 0 6
Perkins 3 2 0 0 1 6
Phelps 6 1 2 0 0 9
Pierce 9 0 3 0 0 12
Platte 16 1 2 0 1 20
Polk 1 0 4 0 0 5
Red Willow 7 2 2 0 0 11
Richardson 20 1 3 0 0 24
Rock 15 0 0 0 1 16


































































* NEBRASKA STATE DEP'T. OF EDUCATION, REPORT OF THE NEB. STATE COMM.
FOR SCHOOL DIST. REORGANIZATION (1971).
15
6
47
21
6
47
11
28
19
9
2
12
14
9
29
5
1
7
1,408
FINANCING PUBLIC EDUCATION
Ohio 631
New Jersey 593
Pennsylvania 552
Wisconsin 457
Iowa 453
North Dakota 412
Massachusetts 410
Arkansas 390
Oregon 352
Washington 322
Indiana 319
Kansas 311
Arizona 299
Maine 292
South Dakota 274
Vermont 272
Kentucky 192
Georgia 190
Colorado 181
Connecticut 172
New Hampshire 165
Mississippi 155
North Carolina 152
Tennessee 147
Virginia 133
Wyoming 132
Alabama 118
Idaho 115
South Carolina 93
New Mexico 89
Florida 67
Louisiana 66
West Virginia 55
Utah 40
Rhode Island 40
Alaska 29
Delaware 26
Maryland 24
Nevada 17
Hawaii 1
